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WILLIAM TURPIN

Tacitus, Stoic exempla, and the praecipuum
munus annalium

Tacitus’ claim that history should inspire good deeds and deter bad ones (Annals 3.65) should
be taken seriously: his exempla are supposed to help his readers think through their own moral
diﬃculties. This approach to history is found in historians with clear connections to Stoicism,
and in Stoic philosophers like Seneca. It is no coincidence that Tacitus is particularly interested
in the behavior of Stoics like Thrasea Paetus, Barea Soranus, and Seneca himself. They, and
even non-Stoic characters like Epicharis and Petronius, exemplify the behavior necessary if
Roman freedom was to survive the monarchy.

Exsequi sententias haud institui nisi insignes per honestum aut notabili
dedecore, quod praecipuum munus annalium reor, ne virtutes sileantur
utque pravis dictis factisque ex posteritate et infamia metus sit.
Tac. Ann. 3.65.11
The claim that history should inspire good deeds and deter bad ones has often
been seen as purely conventional; scholars like Bessie Walker and Ronald Syme
saw Tacitus as more interested in hard-nosed analysis, and dismissed his remark
as a mere relic of tradition.2 But T. J. Luce pointed out that it was in fact rare
for historians to claim that their readers would be deterred, or inspired, by the
prospect of becoming part of the historical record.3 And this prompted Tony
I am grateful to Margaret Graver, Brad Inwood, Martha Nussbaum for some informal communications, and to Liana Katz, Martin Ostwald, and Bryce Walker for reading an earlier draft.
1. Citations of the Annals and the Histories are from the Teubner editions of Heubner 1983 and
1989; all translations are my own unless otherwise indicated.
2. Walker 1952: 1–2; Syme 1958: 521; Fornara 1983: 118 speaks of Tacitus here paying “lip
service” to “the connection of examples and didacticism.”
3. Luce 1991.
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Woodman to argue that the passage is not the sweeping statement about history
that it is normally taken to be: on Woodman’s view it means that one purpose
(only) of senatorial history (only) was to single out for praise and blame proposals
made in the Senate.4
In this paper I will argue that we should accept that Tacitus saw himself as
writing in large part to provide exempla, for moral purposes; this was indeed the
standard view until about the middle of the twentieth century.5 Good exempla
provide encouragement, and bad ones have a deterrent eﬀect, both for the general
reader and, above all, for people who might ﬁnd themselves used as exempla by
a judgmental historian. Moreover in Tacitus an exemplum is not just a Good Thing
or a Bad Thing; it is also something his readers can use in thinking through their
own decisions. The characters in Tacitus are notoriously complex, whether they
end up on the right or the wrong side of history.6 His readers can thus reﬂect on
each case, and extract the appropriate lessons for themselves.
Tacitus’ approach to exempla is illuminated, and possibly informed, by the use
of exempla in some of the Stoics, particularly Seneca.7 Although many scholars
reject the notion that Tacitus is in any sense a Stoic, or even fundamentally
sympathetic to Stoics, this view stems in some cases from a failure to recognize
how ﬂexible and interactive Stoic moral teaching could be. Stoics could urge you
to remember that virtue—living in accordance with nature—was the proper goal
in life, but they were remarkably open-minded about what that meant in practice.
They knew that people were morally frail and might not automatically do the right
thing, and they also knew that it was not always easy to know what the right thing
actually was. But Stoics believed they could provide inspiration (and deterrence)
to help compensate for natural moral weakness. They could also help you decide
on the right course of action, given your particular situation and character. They
would use the best teaching tools at their disposal: philosophical arguments and
individual precepts, certainly, but also exempla.
Tacitus, in my view, is doing much the same thing. The behavior of many
Romans had clearly disappointed him. But Rome was not necessarily a lost cause,
because people could still be inspired to do what was right, and they could be
deterred from doing the opposite. And since the insight necessary for making the
right decisions was not easy to come by, especially under the emperors, it was
all the more important for them to know what others had done.8
Historical writing of this kind would not of itself provide either the courage
or the insight that would keep monarchs from turning into tyrants. But it might
4. Woodman 1995 [rpt. 1998].
5. For the early modern period see esp. Salmon 1989; Schellhase 1976. For more recent views
see e.g. Furneaux 1968: 27; Klingner 1932; Kornemann 1947: 40.
6. Luce 1986; Pelling 1993.
7. Zimmermann 1889 remains useful, though some of his suggested parallels are unconvincing.
See also Abel 1990; Brinkmann 2002.
8. See esp. Ann. 4.33.2, discussed in section 6 below.
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help. And exempla were at least something tangible that a Roman senator could
contribute, if he had literary talent, historical interests, and a real appreciation
for the lessons of Stoicism.9
1. PRAECIPUUM MUNUS ANNALIUM

Tacitus’ comment about the purpose of history comes as an apology for
his subject matter, prompted by a series of senatorial debates: discussion of the
tribunicia potestas is followed by discussion of provincial rights to asylum, which
in turn is followed by the question of what priests should undertake sacriﬁces for
the ailing Livia (Ann. 3.56–9; 3.60–63; 3.64). At this point Tacitus breaks oﬀ to
explain why he has reported on senatorial decisions that the reader might well
see as trivial. The discussions, he says, prompted displays either of integrity
or obsequiousness, and the historian is obliged to report such things: he should
commemorate good behavior and deter its opposite.
Unfortunately, as Woodman has pointed out, there are two ambiguities in
the Latin.10 In the ﬁrst place, there is no way to tell whether praecipuum munus
annalium means the most important function of annalistic history or a most
important one.11 More important, the precise function of quod is remarkably
unclear. Most scholars have taken it simply as “because,” in which case Tacitus is
explaining the duties of an annalistic historian:
I chose not to go through [senatorial] opinions unless they were conspicuous for being honest or notably disgraceful, because [quod] I think it
is the [or “a”] primary function of annals to make sure that virtues are
not silenced and that immoral words and deeds should fear posterity and
public disgrace.
This interpretation seems easy enough, but there is reason to doubt that the
sentence is so straightforward. Tacitus uses very similar language in a discussion
of Tiberius, where quod is a relative pronoun:
percensuitque cursim numerum legionum et quas provincias tutarentur.
quod mihi quoque exsequendum reor, quae tunc Romana copia in armis,
qui socii reges, quanto sit angustius imperitatum.
Ann. 4.4.3

9. Seneca oﬀers an illuminating parallel, see Roller 2001: 66: “Seneca suggests to his
aristocratic readers that, if attentive to his ethical reforms, they stand to reclaim certain privileges
and powers traditionally exercised by the aristocracy but recently monopolized by the princeps.” See
esp. Sen. Tranq. 3.4–5 and 4.1–8 on the value of participation in public life, as long as participation
is possible.
10. Woodman 1995: 112 [rpt. 1998: 87–89]; brieﬂy Woodman and Martin 1996: 451–56.
11. Luce 1991: 2905n.3 observes that praecipuum seems to mean “both that which is special
to history and that which takes precedence over other munera of history.”
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He brieﬂy inventoried the number of legions and the provinces they
were guarding. Which I think I too need to review—what were then the
Roman forces under arms, who were the allied kings, and how much more
restricted was our empire.
As a relative pronoun quod here has a dual function: its antecedent is percensuit
. . . tutarentur, but it also introduces the subsequent elucidation in quae . . .
imperitatum. Many scholars have suggested that quod in our passage works
in the same way:
I chose not to go through [senatorial] opinions unless they were conspicuous for being honest or notably disgraceful, which [quod] is what
I regard as the [or “a”] primary function of annals—to make sure that
virtues are not silenced and that immoral words and deeds should be
afraid of posterity and public disgrace.
As my translation tries to emphasize, quod, as a relative pronoun, looks back to
the ﬁrst part of the sentence (Exsequi . . . dedecore), and also looks forward to
its conclusion (reor . . . ne virtutes sileantur).
Woodman argues that the passage about Tiberius is not really a close parallel,
on the grounds that the dual function of quod is made easier there by the fact that
the word it goes with, exsequendum, means much the same thing as percensuit.
He concludes that in Annals 3.65 quod does indeed introduce a relative clause,
but suggests that it is entirely retrospective: the praecipuum munus annalium has
nothing to do with remembering virtue and censuring evil deeds, but refers only to
the recording of opinions uttered in the Senate. Woodman translates the passage
thus:
It has not been my practice to go through senatorial sententiae in detail
except those conspicuous for honour or notable shame (which I reckon to
be a very great responsibility of annals), lest virtues be silenced and so
that crooked words and deeds should, in the light of posterity and infamy,
attract dread.12
This is no doubt a possible reading of the Latin, and Woodman is certainly right
that Tacitus’ remark is prompted by his interest in senatorial deliberations. But
Woodman is not drawn to this more restrictive reading by the ambiguities of the
Latin alone; he accepts that it is “perhaps not impossible” that quod is a relative
pronoun with a dual function.13 His real objection is a much more general one.
Accepting Luce’s observation that the only close parallels to Tacitus’ statement
(as traditionally understood) are in Diodorus, Woodman wonders whether it
is likely “that Rome’s greatest historian would have deﬁned ‘history’s highest
12. Woodman 1995: 116 [rpt. 1998: 91–92].
13. Woodman 1995: 112 [rpt. 1998: 88] argues from the diﬃculty of understanding a dual
function for “this” in English.
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function’ in terms which are perceived by scholars to be emphatic but which
are so unconventional that they cannot be paralleled except in a relatively minor
Greek historian.”14
But the comments of Diodorus, like those of Tacitus, are part of a richer
tradition than Woodman allows. It is no coincidence, in my view, that Diodorus’
introduction is clearly inﬂuenced by Stoic ideas about the brotherhood of man and
divine providence.15 The Stoics had particular uses for historical exempla, and
their thoughts on the subject show that Tacitus’ interest in praise and condemnation
had respectable and illuminating precedents.
2. STOICS AND EXEMPLA

The Greeks and Romans regularly invoked individuals from both history and
literature to illustrate and explore their arguments.16 The practice is advocated in
rhetorical textbooks from Aristotle on, but exempla (παραδεγµατα) had appeared
as early as Homer, and continued to be a regular feature of Greek and Roman
narrative technique.17 The Romans, a people perhaps unusually preoccupied with
their ancestors, found this literary tradition particularly congenial.18 And one of
the reasons history was attractive was that it was such a good source of exempla:
one rhetorical handbook tells us that history was “philosophy from examples.”19
The Roman Stoics found exempla extremely useful in their ﬁght against moral
weakness; as Seneca says, the philosophical journey is long if you rely on basic
principles, but shorter and easier if you use exempla (Sen. EM. 6.5: longum iter
est per praecepta, breve et efficax per exempla). This feature of their thinking
is ignored in much modern work on Stoicism, but Martha Nussbaum has called
attention to the importance that the education of others had for the Stoics, and
to the fact that exempla were among their most important tools.20 The Stoics
were certainly not alone in this: Seneca explicitly says that he learned about the

14. Woodman 1995: 116 [rpt. 1998: 91].
15. See below, section 3.
16. Alewell 1912; Kornhardt 1936; Lumpe 1966; for exempla in medieval and early modern
literature see Bremond, LeGoﬀ, and Schmitt 1982; Lyons 1989.
17. Arist. Rhet. 1356a; 1393ab. For the rhetorical writers see esp. Martin 1974: 119–24; Price
1975. For Homer see Willcock 2001.
18. Mayer 1991: 145–47; Hölkeskamp 1996; Roller 2004; Walter 2004: esp. 51–62.
19. ps.-Dion. Hal. Ars Rhet. 11.2: στορα φιλοσοφα στν κ παραδειγµτων; for the text,
Usener and Radermacher 1965: 376. See also Cic. Or. 2.36: Historia vero testis temporum, lux
veritatis, vita memoriae, magistra vitae, nuntia vetustatis (“History, witness of the past, light of
truth, life of memory, teacher of life, herald of antiquity”), with Koselleck 1967. On exempla in
ancient historians see also Woodman 1977: 30–45; Fornara 1983: 10–20; Wiedemann 2000; Gärtner
2001.
20. Nussbaum 1994: 316–41; see also Davidson 1907: 84–86; Fiore 1986: 92–97; Rutherford
1989: 26–28; Inwood 2005: 341–44; Reydams-Schils 2005: 18–24. For the early modern period
see Salmon 1989.
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importance of role models from Epicurus.21 But there is some evidence to suggest
that the Stoics were particularly associated with exempla.22 Plutarch, for example,
apparently sees exempla (perhaps historical ones) as fundamental to the teaching
of his Stoic opponents: οδ ν ζλουν ργα κα πρξεις κα λγους κα βους
νων ε πντας !σα"τως πνιγοµ#νους $π% τ&ς 'φροσ"νης κα µοχθηρας
+,ρων (Plut. Comm. Not. 1063b: “they would not be emulating the deeds and
actions and words and lives of some men, if in their view all men were swamped
in the same way by stupidity and baseness”).23 And the founders of the school
were clearly aware that exempla could be useful. Zeno was interested enough
to provide a deﬁnition.24 And Chrysippus used the case of Medea to explore the
potential conﬂict between reason and the passions, apparently at great length.25
He was also interested in the moral deterrence of paradeigmata: he explains that
in Hesiod Zeus punishes the wicked -πως τ.ν πονηρ.ν κολαζοµ#νων ο λοιπο
παραδεγµασι το"τοις χρ,µενοι /ττον πιχειρ.σι τοιο0τν τι ποιε1ν (Plut.
Stoic. Repugn. 1040c = SVF. 2.1175: “so that when the wicked are punished,
the rest will employ them as examples, and thus they will try less often to do
that sort of thing”).
It remains unclear whether the use of historical exempla that features so
prominently in Cicero and Seneca owes much to Stoic doctrine. Roland Mayer
has argued that for Seneca the Roman literary tradition was far more important than
his Stoicism.26 Certainly many of the comments about exempla in Stoic writers
reﬂect the teachings of rhetorical handbooks, or are perhaps merely common
sense. Moreover the relationship between what is “Roman” and what is “Stoic” is
complicated and sometimes impossible to pin down,27 and Seneca’s ideas can be
elusive in much the same way.28 But the important point is that, whatever their
21. Sen. EM. 11.9, discussed in section 2.1 below.
22. Nussbaum 1994: 339 makes a strong claim indeed: “In Stoic teaching narratives and
examples will play a central role. There is no moral philosophy in the Western tradition in which this
is more evident; it is a constant practice, and it is also a part of the oﬃcial theory.” The only evidence
she cites for “oﬃcial theory” is Cic. Tusc. 3.79, which does not seem to me to prove the point.
23. See also Plut. Stoic. Repugn. 1038f. = SVF 3.212, where Chrysippus perhaps suggests that
examples of virtuous behavior are central to arguments about morality.
24. Anon. on Rhetoric, Spengel Rhet. Gr. 1.447, line 11 = SVF 1.84: !ς δ2 Ζνων4 παρδειγµ
στι γενοµ#νου πργµατος 'ποµνηµνευσις ε ς 5µοωσιν το0 ν0ν ζητουµ#νου (“According to
Zeno paradeigma is a reminiscence of something that happened, to show similarity with the thing
now under consideration.”) Dilts and Kennedy 1997: 45 suggest that this is the rhetorical writer
Zeno of Athens rather than Zeno of Citium.
25. SVF 2.347; 2.906 [3-4]; D.L. 7.180. See also Gill 1983 and 1996: 158–62.
26. Mayer 1991; also Castagna 1991; Heikkinen 1997. For historical exempla in Cicero see
Rambaud 1953: 25–36; Rawson 1972; Dörrie 1978.
27. Brunt 1975: 7 compares the inﬂuence of Christianity “on men ignorant or careless of the
nicer points of systematic theology.” Roller 2001 oﬀers a nuanced exploration of the relationship
between the ideas of the Roman Stoics and those of Roman society more generally.
28. On Seneca’s Stoic “orthodoxy” see Rist 1989; Cooper 2004: 309–34; Inwood 2005. Seneca
certainly thought of himself as a Stoic; see Sen. Const. Sap. 2.1; Otio 3.1; NQ. 7.22.1.
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sources of inspiration, the Roman Stoics clearly regarded exempla as more than
mere decorations or illustrations.29 They could be ﬂexible and powerful elements
in moral instruction.
The Stoics apparently never produced a systematic discussion of exempla, and
what follows is not intended to ﬁll that void; I want instead merely to point out six
aspects of exempla that were important both to the Stoics and to Tacitus. First, the
Stoics saw that exempla could provide moral inspiration as eﬀectively as doctrinal
arguments or moral precepts. Second, they realized that people did not have to
be perfect, or even generally admirable, to oﬀer inspiration; barbarians, people
of low social standing, and people who had not always behaved well could be
even more inspiring than the more obvious role models. Third, the Stoics thought
that the deterrence oﬀered by bad behavior could be just as useful as exempla
that inspired emulation. Fourth, they were particularly interested in how people
faced death, and went out of their way to collect exempla of good and bad deaths.
Fifth, the Stoics found exempla to be useful vehicles for moral reﬂection; exempla
were, as people say nowadays, “good to think with.” Stoics also believed, ﬁnally,
that they could help others by becoming exempla themselves.
2.1

 

One antidote for moral weakness, of course, is other people. Seneca and
Marcus Aurelius took pains to identify and think about role models, starting with
people they actually knew: even when not physically present, such people oﬀered
both inspiration and a way to test one’s values and choices. Marcus makes the
point at the beginning of his Meditations, listing people to whom he was indebted
for moral instruction. Marcus never identiﬁes these people as paradeigmata,
and he talks about what he learned from the Gods as well as his friends and
relatives. But his discussions of the people he admired, particularly his fatherby-adoption and predecessor, are eloquent testimony to the power that real-life
exempla can have.30 And Seneca provides a more theoretical discussion of the
same principle: he believes, following Epicurus, that everyone needs at least
one person to defer to, morally, as a check on innate weaknesses, since fear is
a particularly good incitement to virtue.31 And such a role model does not have
to be physically present to have such an impact: O felicem illum, qui non praesens
29. For exempla purely for entertainment value see ps.-Menander 2.4 (389 Spengel), in Russell
and Wilson 1981; also Auct. ad Herenn. 2.29.46; Quint. 5.11.5.
30. M. Ant. 1.1–17; Rutherford 1989: 55–59.
31. Sen. EM. 11.9: Hoc, mi Lucili, Epicurus praecepit. Custodem nobis et paedagogum dedit,
ne immerito. Magna pars peccatorum tollitur, si peccaturis testis adsistit. Aliquem habeat animus,
quem vereatur, cuius auctoritate etiam secretum suum sanctius faciat (“This, my dear Lucilius, is
what Epicurus recommends. He has given us a guardian and a teacher, and not without good reason: a
large portion of errors is removed if there is a witness when someone is about to err. The mind should
have someone to fear, by whose authority he can make even his inmost sanctuary more holy”). See
also Sen. EM. 11.8; 25.5–6; Musonius 61H. On the whole topic see Hadot 1969: 171–74.
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tantum, sed etiam cogitatus emendat! (Sen. EM. 11.9: “How fortunate is the
person who makes corrections not just when present, but even when in someone’s
thoughts!”).32
The Stoics gave pride of place to role models who were still living, since they
were present in everyday interactions or easy to call to mind.33 But exempla in
books still had value. Some might be found in literature; Seneca suggests that
the most important thing about poetry was that it oﬀered exempla such as Ulysses,
whose devotion to home and country could be an inspiration to us all.34 But history
was a still richer source of exempla virtutis, which had more impact because they
were more immediate.35 Some of Seneca’s historical role models come from
Greek history, such as Leonidas and his Spartans.36 And Seneca also draws on
the biographical and doxographical traditions that were such an important part of
Greek philosophical teaching; Socrates is Seneca’s most important role model, but
later philosophers are cited as well, including Epicurus, Diogenes, and prominent
Stoics.37 But most of Seneca’s models of virtue are Roman. Many of them are
traditional ones, familiar from Roman history and rhetoric, but there are also
plenty of ﬁgures from the recent past.38 These include military and political
ﬁgures, but Cato Uticensis and Demetrius the Cynic embody a kind of fusion of
traditional history and philosophical biography.39
Seneca is quite explicit about the value of historical exempla, Roman and
non-Roman alike. They can, he tells Lucilius, provide comfort, encouragement,
and inspiration, and they are easy to ﬁnd, since there are so many of them; he points
particularly to Rutilius Rufus, Metellus Numidicus, Mucius Scaevola, and Cato
(Sen. EM. 24.4–8). Seneca recognizes that these exempla might seem hackneyed
(Sen. EM. 24.6). But their aggregate eﬀect, he thinks, can make Lucilius more
resolute, strengthening a nature which is human, and therefore weak: Non in hoc
exempla nunc congero, ut ingenium exerceam, sed ut te adversus id, quod maxime
terribile videtur, exhorter (Sen. EM. 24.9: “I don’t pile up these exempla as an
intellectual exercise, but to encourage you in your struggle against the thing that
seems so terrible to you”).

32. See also Sen. EM. 25.7; Otio 1.1.
33. Sen. EM. 6.5–6.
34. Sen. EM. 88.7. For Stoicism and poetry see de Lacy 1948; Nussbaum 1993.
35. This point is made explicitly at Quint. 5.11.17. In general see Litchﬁeld 1914.
36. Sen. EM. 82.21–23. Much more common are references to the Persian kings as mala
exempla, on which see below; Sen. EM. 86.1; Ben. 6.31; 7.3.1; Brev. 17.1; Ira 3.16.4. See Bogun
1968.
37. For the Stoics see e.g. Sen. EM. 6.6; 104.22; Ben. 7.8.2; on the doxographical tradition
see Mejer 1978.
38. See esp. Mayer 1991.
39. For Cato see Griﬃn 1992: 182–94; Pecchiura 1965: 59–71. For Demetrius see Griﬃn 1992:
111–12; Gill 2003: 48.
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Seneca sometimes discusses exemplary actions performed by people in whom
heroism is somewhat surprising. There is nothing particularly Stoic about this
interest; Quintilian (5.11.10) tells us that, since women are usually less courageous
than men, the woman who killed Pyrrhus is more inspiring than Horatius and
Torquatus, and Lucretia is more inspiring than Cato and Scipio. But Seneca
extends the principle in two ways.
First, he invokes captive barbarians and slaves, in a kind of ethnic and social a
fortiori argument: if such people can make courageous choices, he and his friends
should be able to do so as well. Seneca cites a story of Claudius Quadrigarius
about two slaves who saved their mistress from Spartacus’ army, and claims that
it was their humble status that made their mistress, who in gratitude gave them
their freedom, into a signiﬁcant exemplum (Sen. Ben. 3.23.2–4). He also tells
Lucilius about a German prisoner and a gladiator, who killed themselves (with
great diﬃculty) rather than continue lives they did not value. His point is that one
does not have to be a Cato to have the correct view of life and death, and indeed
that such examples are all the more powerful, since when such low characters
are not afraid of death we are prompted to ask more of ourselves (Sen. EM.
70.19–23).40
The same logic, mutatis mutandis, applies to Seneca’s use of Metellus Scipio.
This Scipio, the father-in-law of Pompey, was spectacularly aristocratic by birth
and adoption, but (according to Seneca) he was someone who for most of his life
had been fairly cowardly. Faced with capture by Caesar’s forces, however, he fell
on his sword, after delivering a memorable one-liner: “imperator,” inquit, “se
bene habet” (Sen. EM. 24.9: “ ‘The general,’ he said, ‘is doing well’ ”). Heroism
in such an unlikely character is all the more inspirational; in death, says Seneca,
this Scipio actually surpassed the courage of his famous ancestors.41
2.3

 

The Stoics also had their uses for examples of what to avoid.42 Here again they
were not alone: Horace famously says that his father pointed to various people
as illustrations of what not to become (Hor. Serm. 1.4.103–129). But the Stoics’
interest in the moral improvement of others meant that they were interested in
anything that could make a moral statement, and stories of bad behavior could
certainly do that. As with exempla for inspiration, mala exempla could be found in
literature as well as real life. Epictetus suggests that the real point of tragedies
40. Note esp. EM. 70.22: Plus enim a se quisque exiget, si viderit hanc rem etiam a contemptissimis posse contemni (“For a person will make greater demands on himself, if he sees that such
a thing [i.e. death] can be despised by the lowest of the low”). See also Ben. 3.19.2–3.
41. See Mayer 1991: 154–55.
42. Sen. Ira 3.22.1: exempla, quae vites. The rhetorical writers can speak of arguments from
opposites, e.g. Rhet. ad Alex. 7 1429b–1430a.
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is that they oﬀer examples of people who come to grief because they are too
concerned with worldly things (Epict. 1.4.25–26), and it has been suggested that
Seneca wrote his tragedies for much the same purpose.43 But there were also
plenty of mala exempla to be found in history, Roman as well as foreign.44 The
recent past had a lot to oﬀer.45 Above all there was the emperor Gaius, whom
Seneca invokes as an archetype for arrogance, cruelty, extravagance, insanity,
and a vicious sense of humor.46
Seneca can be quite explicit about the moral value of of mala exempla from
history. He concludes an account of the weird ways in which Gaius coped with
the death of his sister by telling his readers that they should be very diﬀerent (Sen.
Cons. Pol. 17.4–6). Seneca even suggests that Gaius was intended by Nature
as an exemplum (though he does not use the word), to show the world just how
bad the combination of vices and good fortune could be (Sen. Cons. Helv. 10.4).
In day-to-day life it was presumably a little tactless to try to improve one’s friends
by invoking exempla of evil, and exempla of good behavior are certainly more
common in Seneca; but mala exempla clearly had their uses.
The moral lessons could be somewhat subtle ones. Seneca repeats Herodotus’
story of the drunken Cambyses, who used the son of Prexaspes for target practice,
to condemn and explore the complicity of the father (Sen. Ira 3.14–15). In
theory Seneca’s point is that it is possible to control one’s anger even in the most
diﬃcult circumstances (Sen. Ira 3.14.4). But his most important point is that the
acquiescence of Prexaspes was worse than the cruelty of Cambyses. Some might
say that it would have been both futile and fatal if Prexaspes had shown his anger
(Sen. Ira 3.14.5–6). But Seneca, who of course has a personal interest in relations
with a tyrant, doesn’t believe that for a minute: Prexaspes should have protested,
and invited Cambyses to shoot him as well (Sen. Ira 3.14.3).
2.4

  

If there is one thing the Roman Stoics were known for, it was their willingness,
when appropriate, to die. Even more important, for our purposes, was their
willingness to talk about the subject, not only to explore the moral complexities
of suicide, but also to counter the normal human failing of being afraid of it.
John Rist has argued that Seneca was unusual among Stoics in being morbidly
interested in suicide, which for Seneca was the ultimate mechanism for defending

43. See the useful survey of the debate by Rosenmeyer 1989: 14–36.
44. Sen. Ira 3.18.1: Utinam ista saevitia intra peregrina exempla mansisset nec in Romanos
mores cum aliis adventiciis vitiis etiam suppliciorum irarumque barbaria transisset! (“Would that
these savageries had remained among the barbarian exempla and that the barbarity of punishments
and angers had not been transferred to Roman customs along with the other alien vices!”). Seneca
goes on to give examples.
45. Sen. Ira 3.18.3: Quid antiqua perscrutor? (“Why do I scrutinize the past?”).
46. Sen. Ira 1.20.8; 2.33.3–4; 3.18.3–4; 3.21.5; Brev. 18.5–6; Pol. Cons. 17.4–6; Helv. Cons.
10.4; Ben. 2.12; 2.21.5; 4.31.2; 7.11. For Gaius’ “witty” insults see Const. Sap. 18.
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personal virtue.47 But while this preoccupation may point to something distinctive
and rather sad about Seneca’s psychological makeup, it was also part of a more
general Stoic concern with conquering the fear of death. Those who faced death
well had something important to teach the rest of us.48
For the Stoics life was at best a preferred indiﬀerent, and it followed that death
was always available as an escape from evil.49 But Seneca also knew that this logic
could be easier to accept intellectually than emotionally, and he worked hard to
persuade his readers of what in theory they already knew. Thus the De Providentia
ends with a spectacular tirade in which “God” scolds anyone who complains about
life’s unfairness, on the grounds that He has made death available to anyone who
wants it (Sen. Prov. 6.7). On top of that, “God” continues, death is quick. So
there is no reason to be afraid of it: “Ecquid erubescitis? Quod tam cito fit, timetis
diu!” (Sen. Prov. 6.9: “ ‘Why aren’t you ashamed of yourselves? You spend so
much time being afraid of something that happens so quickly!’ ”).
Because people tended instinctively to resist this view of death, Seneca often
resorted to historical exempla. It is no accident that so many of his historical
ﬁgures displayed their virtues in the manner of their deaths rather than in their
lives. Socrates and Cato are of course the most obvious martyr ﬁgures in Seneca’s
array of exempla virtutis, and we hear far more about their deaths than about their
teaching or their politics. But Seneca has plenty of other examples of people whose
deaths have much to teach us, some of whom we have encountered already. And
Seneca also tells us about people who wrongly value life too highly; his solution
to the moral dilemma of Prexaspes, or anyone in an analagous position, is suicide:
Quaeris quod sit ad libertatem iter? Quaelibet in corpore tuo vena! (Sen. Ira
3.15.4: “Do you want to know the road to freedom? Any vein in your body!”).
The reign of Nero saw an outbreak of books about the deaths of famous
people.50 Their authors were moved partly by connections with the victims and
partly by political opposition to the regime, but it is also possible that these
authors, like Seneca, had philosophical reasons for their interest in exempla of
death. Whatever the ultimate reason for Seneca’s interest in death, at least, he was
certainly not alone.51
2.5

  

The Stoics also found exempla to be powerful tools for thinking about practical
ethics. Almost by deﬁnition exempla can only be useful after pondering the lessons
47. Rist 1969: ch. 13; Rist 1989: esp. 2004–2006.
48. For Seneca’s discussions of death see esp. Inwood 2005: 305–12.
49. Schoﬁeld 2003: 239. For early Stoic statements about reason and death see SVF 3. nos.
757–68.
50. Pliny, Ep. 1.17.3; 5.5.5; Ronconi 1940; MacMullen 1966: 70–93.
51. See M. Ant. 1.14 where Marcus shows that he is grateful he learned about ﬁve men who died
in resisting tyranny: Thrasea Paetus and Helvidius Priscus, Cato and Brutus, and (probably) Dio
of Syracuse. For the identiﬁcation of Dio see Rutherford 1989: 64n.51.
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learned, and their relevance to our own situation.52 But the Stoics believed that
everyone had a particular role to play in the great scheme of things, and since
everyone had to decide what precisely that role was, applying the lessons of
particular exempla inevitably involved distilling diﬀerent moral lessons from
diﬀerent stories.53 Thus for Seneca exempla did more than provoke emulation
or revulsion; they also had a certain complexity, to provide useful topics for
exploration by a wide range of readers.54
The Stoic who came closest to exploring this issue seems to have been
Posidonius, who laid particular emphasis on the fallibility of people and their
improvement. The evidence is preserved by Seneca, who in Epistles 94 and 95
ﬁrst argues for the primacy of doctrine in moral teaching, and then makes the
case for the importance of individual moral rules (praecepta); these, he says, are
often in daily life more useful.55 Posidonius thought that turning people towards
philosophy could require not only abstract principles but also more practical
techniques, such as persuasion, consolation and exhortation, and the investigation
of causes. It was also helpful to provide concrete, if invented, examples of each
virtue:
Ait utilem futuram et descriptionem cuiusque virtutis; hanc Posidonius
ethologian vocat, quidam characterismon appellant, signa cuiusque virtutis ac vitii et notas reddentem, quibus inter se similia discriminentur.
Sen. EM. 95.65
He says that the depiction of each virtue will also be useful; Posidonius
calls this “ethology,” while others call it “characterization”: it renders the
signs and marks of each virtue and each vice, by which things that are
similar to one another may be distinguished.
Seneca goes on to explain that an example (here exemplar) can have much the
same eﬀect as a precept.
Haec res eandem vim habet quam praecipere. Nam qui praecipit, dicit:
“illa facies, si voles temperans esse.” Qui describit, ait: “temperans est,
qui illa facit, qui illis abstinet.” Quaeris, quid intersit? Alter praecepta
virtutis dat, alter exemplar. Descriptiones has et, ut publicanorum utar
verbo, iconismos ex usu esse conﬁteor; proponamus laudanda, invenietur
imitator. Putas utile dari tibi argumenta, per quae intellegas nobilem
equum, ne fallaris empturus, ne operam perdas in ignavo? Quanto hoc
52. See esp. the extended discussion of Regulus at Cic. Off . 3.99–115.
53. The point is encapsulated in the “four persona theory” of Panaetius: Gill 1988.
54. Habinek 2000: 265: “As Seneca’s own discursive practice makes clear, an exemplum did
not have to be exclusively good or exclusively bad. What was required was a vividness that made the
exemplum memorable and a narrative complexity that made it potentially applicable to a variety
of situations and issues.” The most detailed exploration of this aspect of Stoicism known to me is
Graver 1996.
55. See esp. Bellincioni 1979; Kidd 1988: 646–51.
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utilius est, excellentis animi notas nosse, quas ex alio in se transferre
permittitur.
Sen. EM. 95.66–67
This has much the same eﬀect as giving precepts. For the person who
gives precepts says “This is what to do if you want to be temperate.”
But the person who gives descriptions says “The temperate person is one
who does the these things, and refrains from doing those.” You ask what
the diﬀerence is? The ﬁrst gives instructions about virtue, the second
gives an exemplar. I confess that these descriptions and “iconisms” (if
I may use the word of a tax man) are useful: if we put forth things that
are praiseworthy someone will be found to imitate them. You know how
useful it is to be be given indications of how to recognize a noble steed, so
that you won’t make a mistake when trying to buy one, and won’t waste
your time with a bad horse: it is even more useful to recognize the marks
of an excellent spirit, which you can appropriate for yourself.
Speciﬁc examples, in other words, serve two purposes. They clearly have a
protreptic function, since Seneca assumes that the outward signs of a virtuous
nature will automatically inspire us to emulate them. But they also help with the
essential ethical analysis: we have to identify for ourselves the features that reﬂect
the spirit to be emulated.
So far Seneca has been talking about exemplar, not exemplum. The word
exemplar was in theory reserved for an imaginary creation, not a real example
drawn from history or everyday life, but in practice this distinction could be lost.56
He goes on to show how Vergil’s description of a spirited horse could be used to
identify the signs of a great man, and would be ideal for a portrayal of Cato.57 The
discussion illustrates just how interactive the use of examples could be: Vergil’s
description of the horse provides only talking points, and it is up to the reader to
decide which parts of the description apply directly (and why), and which require
modiﬁcation.
Seneca then turns to historical exempla, though he does not use that word
(Sen. EM. 95.72). It is not enough, he says, to describe the characteristics of
good men in the abstract; it is also useful to provide concrete illustrations: Cato
died for freedom, Laelius had wisdom, the elder Cato had worthy deeds, and
Aelius Tubero used only the simplest furniture and utensils. Seneca does not oﬀer
much guidance on how these exempla should be applied to our own lives (we
get an outburst of moral indignation instead), but presumably we can ﬁgure it out.
As with Vergil’s horse, Seneca does not expect us to apply the lessons of these
exempla directly: none of us is a Cato, a Laelius or a Tubero, and the signs of their
excellence can only inspire us, and give us something to think about.

56. Habinek 1987:195.
57. Sen. EM. 95.68–71, citing Verg. Georg. 3.75–81 and 83–85.
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In the case of exempla virtutis, as we have seen, the Stoics valued quantity.
They realized, too, that people did not need to be perfect, or even generally
admirable, to provide exempla that would be useful to others. It is therefore not
surprising that their interest in role models should have extended to their own
potential.58
Guardians and teachers had to come from somewhere, and since no one alive
was a perfect sapiens, imperfect aspirants would have to do what they could.59
After invoking the courage of Mucius Scaevola, Regulus, Socrates, Rutilius, and
Cato, and the abstemiousness of Fabricius, Tubero and Sextius, Seneca goes on to
suggest that he and Lucilius can also be exempla:
Nos quoque aliquid et ipsi faciamus animose; simus inter exempla. Quare
defecimus? Quare desperamus? Quidquid ﬁeri potuit, potest, nos modo
purgemus animum sequamurque naturam, a qua aberranti cupiendum
timendumque est et fortuitis serviendum. Licet reverti in viam, licet in
integrum restitui; restituamur, ut possimus dolores, quocumque modo
corpus invaserint, perferre et fortunae dicere: “cum viro tibi negotium
est; quaere, quem vincas.”
Sen. EM. 98.13–14
We too should ourselves do something spirited: we should be among the
exempla. Why have we fallen short? Why do we give up? Whatever could
happen can happen, if only we cleanse our mind and follow nature; the
one who strays from nature must have desires, and fears, and must be
subject to chance events. It is possible to return to the true path, it is
possible to be made whole; let us become whole, so that we can endure
pain, however it attacks our body, and say to fortune: “You have a man to
deal with; seek someone you can conquer.”
Here the emphasis is on self-improvement; joining the historical exempla is
more a sign of moral progress than something oﬀered to others. But in the de
Tranquillitate Animi Seneca’s interlocutor Serenus shows that such moral progress
can indeed beneﬁt society more generally. Serenus begins with a frank discussion
of his own vices, but that does not stop him from wanting to show others what
he has learned:
Sed ubi lectio fortior erexit animum et aculeos subdiderunt exempla
nobilia, prosilire libet in forum, commodare alteri vocem, alteri operam,
etiam si nihil profuturam, tamen conaturam prodesse, alicuius coercere
in foro superbiam male secundis rebus elati.
Sen. Tranq. 1.12

58. See esp. Edwards 1997; Inwood 2005: 341–45.
59. On the scarcity of Stoic wise men see Donini and Inwood 1999: 717–23.
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But when a heroic reading has stimulated my mind and noble exempla
have applied the spurs, I want to rush into the forum, and lend my voice
to one man, and my assistance to another (even if it will not help, the
attempt is still valuable), and I want to restrain the pride of another man
in the forum who is wrongly exalted by his successes.
The Stoics were presumably not alone in thinking that even imperfect people have
much to oﬀer each other. But it is signiﬁcant, for our purposes at least, that they
were so clearly aware of the connection between exempla from the past and their
own potential as role models in the present, and for the future.
3. STOIC HISTORY

While the Stoic uses of historical exempla are reasonably clear, it is more
diﬃcult to establish whether they actually wrote histories to provide more of
them. The Stoics were certainly not actively hostile to the writing of history,
as has sometimes been said.60 Seneca’s liberal use of historical exempla shows
that he respected the subject, as perhaps does the fact that he planned to publish
his father’s history of the civil war.61 Seneca does say that historical details are
unimportant compared with philosophical truths, and that what has been done
in the past matters less than what ought to be done.62 But of course that is no
contradiction: to see philosophy as paramount does not eliminate history as a
useful resource.
Three Stoics are known to have been historians. Posidonius wrote a number
of historical works, including a continuation of Polybius.63 Strabo, who at a
number of places refers to his adherence to Stoicism, wrote another continuation of
Polybius and perhaps a separate collection of historical essays.64 And Arrian, who
recorded the lectures and doctrines of Epictetus, wrote a personal memoir, regional
histories, an account of events after the death of Alexander, and his famous history
of Alexander’s campaigns.65 We are told explicitly that the histories of Strabo
and Posidonius had philosophical purposes: Strabo tells us that he regarded his
60. Pohlenz 1964: 47. The Stoic attitude to history has not received much attention, but see
Verbeke 1964; Brunt 1977: 32–35; Armisen-Marchetti 1995.
61. Fragment XV Haase = Peter 1914: 2.98. See Griﬃn 1992: 33. According to Lactantius DI.
7.15.14, “Seneca” (the Elder or the Younger) imagined Roman history from Romulus to Augustus as
a series of stages parallel to those of human life.
62. Sen. Brev. 13.8–9; Sen. NQ pr. 3.5–7.
63. Edelstein and Kidd 1989: 77–90; 220–55; see also Kidd 1988 and 1999; von Fritz 1977;
Malitz 1983.
64. The number of Strabo’s historical works is uncertain. Dueck 2000: 70 revives the argument
that the Hypomnemata and “Events after Polybius” were two separate works; see Str. 11.9.3. For
Strabo’s Stoicism, which has been doubted, see Aujac 1983; Dueck 2000: 62–69.
65. For the Anabasis see the edition of Brunt 1976. The fragments of the other historical works
are collected in Roos 2002, II.197–290; 323–24, and more conservatively in FGrHist. II B no. 156;
see esp. Stadter 1980: 133–63.
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histories, like his Geography, as useful for personal ethics and political philosophy
(Str. 1.1.22–23). And Posidonius, according to Athenaeus, used his history to
write about the many practices and customs relevant to his philosophy (Fr. 67
Edelstein-Kidd = Ath. 4.151e.).
It makes sense that Stoics would have seen history as useful for philosophy; if
they could pursue astronomy and physics to help them understand the workings of
Providence, they will surely have seen a similar value in seeing how human events
unfolded. And the Stoics’ emphasis on the common humanity of all people may
also have given them a special incentive to value foreigners, and thus the whole
sweep of human history, as a source of exempla.66 The logic is carefully explained
in the preface of Diodorus, in a passage that certainly reﬂects Stoic ideas, and
may in part be a borrowing from Posidonius himself.67 According to Diodorus, the
authors of universal history, in bringing the diﬀerent races into a unity appropriate
to their common humanity, beneﬁt mankind by providing a uniﬁed account of past
events and a single repository of them (D.S. 1.1.3). And the reason this matters
is that paradeigmata are so useful: καλ%ν γ6ρ τ% δ"νασθαι το1ς τ.ν 7λλων
'γνοµασι πρ%ς διρθωσιν χρ&σθαι παραδεγµασι (D.S. 1.1.4: “for it is good to
be able to use the mistakes of others as examples in making corrections”). The
more exempla a historian can provide, apparently, the better.
It must be admitted that the histories actually produced by Stoics are not as
distinctive as we might have expected. The surviving fragments of Posidonius’
history do oﬀer plenty of examples of behavior that ought to be avoided; because
they are preserved by Athenaeus most such incidents have to do with unfortunate
dining customs, though we do also learn about a fast-talking philosopher.68 But
apparently Posidonius did not explicitly identify characters or events as exempla,
and his characters seem to have been utterly uncomplicated. We might be deterred
from becoming gluttons or conniving hypocrites, but we get little help with more
complicated moral questions.
The histories of Strabo are of course lost to us. His Geography certainly does
contain exempla of various kinds; customs and constitutions, even when obsolete,
are said to be worth knowing because they can oﬀer inspiration or deterrence (Str.
2.5.17 end). But if Strabo wrote about his world in order to increase the supply
of exempla he certainly does not make that clear, nor does he seem particularly
interested in moral issues.
The Stoic who writes history with a more explicit focus on the moral value of
historical exempla is Arrian, in his account of Alexander. This may seem an odd
claim, since most of the Anabasis is a straightforward narrative of Alexander’s
66. For the Stoic interest in geography see Aujac 1983: 19–23; Clarke 1999: 29; more generally
Baldry 1965.
67. Theiler 1982 prints D.S. 1.3 as a fragment 80 of Posidonius. Sacks 1990: 64 argues that
the Stoic ideas here are in Diodorus’ own words; for a survey of views see Theiler 1982: vol. II,
84–86 and Sacks 1990: 10–11.
68. Fragment 253 Edelstein-Kidd = Athen. 5.211d–215b.
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campaigns, with little obvious interest in either the morality of world conquest
or in the people who made it possible.69 But the central ﬁgure of the Anabasis is of
course one of the most famous historical exempla of them all, and one not lacking
in moral complexity. Arrian has no doubt about the greatness of Alexander’s
achievements, and his sober historical narrative lays out the evidence.70 But
it is surely no accident that Alexander’s achievements are set against some
signiﬁcant moral failings, especially the murder of Bessus.71 The moral problem
of Alexander’s career is underscored in a long authorial digression, placed for
emphasis squarely at the center of the work:

κα γ8 ο9τε τ:ν 7γαν τα"την τιµωραν Βσσου παιν., 'λλ6 βαρβαρικ:ν ε>ναι τθεµαι τ.ν 'κρωτηρων τ:ν λ,βην κα $παχθ&ναι
Αλ#ξανδρο
?
ν ξ"µφηµι ς ζ&λον το0 Μηδικο0 τε κα Περσικο0 πλο"του
κα τ&ς κατ6 τοCς βαρβρους βασιλ#ας οκ Dσης ς τοCς $πηκους
ξυνδιαιτσεως, σθ&τ τε -τι Μηδικ:ν 'ντ τ&ς Μακεδονικ&ς τε κα
πατρου EΗρακλεδης Gν µετ#λαβεν, οδαµ&H παιν., κα τ:ν κταριν
τ:ν Περσικ:ν τ.ν νενικηµ#νων 'ντ Iν ατ%ς 5 νικ.ν πλαι φρει
H
'µε1ψαι οκ πηδ#σθη,
οδ2ν το"των παιν., 'λλ εDπερ τι 7λλο, κα
τ6 Αλεξνδρου
?
µεγλα πργµατα ς τεκµηρωσιν τθεµαι !ς ο9τε
τ% σ.µα -τωK εDη καρτερν, ο9τε -στις γ#νει πιφανς, ο9τε κατ6
πλεµον ε δ τις διευτυχοη τι µLλλον M Αλ#ξανδρος,
?
οδ2 ε τ:ν
Λιβ"ην τις πρ%ς τ&H Ασ
? α,O καθπερ οPν πενει κε1νος, κπεριπλε"σας
κατσχοι, οδ2 ε τ:ν Ερ,πην π τ&H Ασ
? αO τε κα Λιβ"ηH τρτην,
το"των πντων οδ#ν τι Rφελος ς εδαιµοναν 'νθρ,που, ε µ:
σωφρονε1ν ν τατ.K $πρχοι το"τωK τ.K 'νθρ,πωK τ.K τ6 µεγλα, !ς
δοκε1, πργµατα πρξαντι.
An. 4.7.4–5
For my part, I do not approve of this excessive punishment of Bessus;
I regard the mutilation of the extremities as barbaric, and I agree that
Alexander was carried away into imitation of Median and Persian opulence and of the custom of barbarian kings not to countenance equality
with subjects in their daily lives. Nor do I at all approve the facts that,
though a descendant of Heracles, he substituted the dress of Medes for
that traditional with Macedonians and that he was not ashamed to exchange the tiara of the Persians, whom he himself had conquered, for
the head-dress he had long worn, but I take it that nothing is clearer
proof than Alexander’s great successes of the truth that neither bodily
strength in anyone nor distinction of birth nor continuous good fortune
in war, greater even than Alexander’s—no matter if a man were to sail out
right round Libya as well as Asia and subdue them, as Alexander actually
thought of doing, or were to make Europe, with Asia and Libya, a third

69. Thus Brunt 1976: vol. I, p. x: “I can detect no Stoic colouring in the Anabasis.”
70. See especially the “second preface” at Arr. An. 1.12; Moles 1985; Marincola 1989.
71. See also Arr. An. 4.9 (murder of Cleitus, proskynesis); 4.13.5–6 (the pages’ conspiracy).
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part of his empire—that not one of all these things is any contribution
to man’s happiness, unless the man whose achievements are apparently
so great were to possess at the same time command of his own passions.72
Alexander is thus a more complicated ﬁgure than we might have expected, and
much more useful than someone who was merely very great, or very bad.73 It
is tempting to wonder whether Arrian was interested in Alexander as a way to
explore the nature of monarchy, as Dio Chrysostom was, but his interest need
not have been political.74 Seneca, at least, found in Alexander an exemplum of
more general application, as the man who could conquer so much of the world,
and fail to conquer his own passions.75 Arrian and Seneca never explain what
lessons we should draw from this, but in telling us about Alexander they do invite
us to think about the problem.
The extent to which Posidonius, Strabo, and Arrian wrote history expressly to
provide moral exempla must remain uncertain. But it is worth suggesting that a
philosophical agenda of this sort may illuminate the statements of other historians
about their moral purposes.76 There is of course nothing particularly philosophical
about an interest in exempla that inspire emulation.77 But Livy adds the interesting
corollary that mala exempla can deter bad behavior, and it is clear that he took
this perception seriously.78 It is perhaps no coincidence that Livy was known to
Seneca as the author of philosophical dialogues as well as history, and at least
one modern scholar has suggested that he was a Stoic.79
Diodorus and Tacitus go further, as we have seen. Like Livy they point to
the moral uses of exempla as central to the writing of history, and they point out
that people who act well or badly can end up as exempla themselves. Diodorus
72. Translated by Brunt 1976, slightly modiﬁed.
73. Stadter 1980: 103–14 and Bosworth 1980: 12–16 see the discussions of Alexander’s failings
as digressions that do not seriously diminish Arrian’s praise.
74. On the Stoic background of Dio Chrys. Orat. 2 see Pohlenz 1964: 414–34; Brunt 1973
[rpt. 1993].
75. Sen. EM. 113.29–31. See also Livy’s digression on Alexander at 9.2 with Morello 2002;
on Alexander as an exemplum see Fears 1974; Spencer 2002.
76. See Fornara 1983: 104–20.
77. Ephorus, FGrHist. no. 70, frag. 42 = Str. 7.3.9; see also Sall. Jug. 4.5–6; D.H. A.R. 1.6.4;
5.75.1.
78. Livy Praef . 10: Hoc illud est praecipue in cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te
exempli documenta in inlustri posita monumento intueri; inde tibi tuaeque rei publicae quod imitere
capias, inde foedum inceptu foedum exitu quod vites (“This is something particularly beneﬁcial
and fruitful in understanding things, that you can examine the evidence for every exemplum laid
out clearly; and from that you can grasp what you should imitate, for your own beneﬁt and for
that of your country, and what, being rotten from start to ﬁnish, you should avoid.”); see Feldherr
1998; Chaplin 2000. Note that Livy was apparently anticipated by Sempronius Asellio, Frag. 2 in
Peter 1914: 1.179–80 = Gell. 5.18.7: Nam neque alacriores, inquit, ad rem p. defendendum neque
segniores ad rem perperam faciundam annales libri commovere quicquam possunt (“For, he said,
the books of annals cannot [in contrast to history] make anyone more willing to defend the state
or more reluctant to harm it.”)
79. Sen. EM. 100.9; Walsh 1961: 49–65.
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makes this point in three of his prefaces, including his preface to the whole work.
History, he says, not only passes on the accumulated wisdom of the ages, but also
provides moral encouragement for the bad and the good alike:

κα τοCς µ2ν δι,τας 'ξους Tγεµονας κατασκευζει, τοCς δ Tγεµνας τ.K δι6 τ&ς δξης 'θανατισµ.K προτρ#πεται το1ς καλλστοις τ.ν
ργων πιχειρε1ν, χωρς δ2 το"των τοCς µ2ν στρατι,τας το1ς µετ6 τ:ν
τελευτ:ν πανοις +τοιµοτ#ρους κατασκευζει πρ%ς τοCς $π2ρ τ&ς
πατρδος κινδ"νους, τοCς δ2 πονηροCς τ.ν 'νθρ,πων τα1ς α ωνοις
βλασφηµαις 'ποτρ#πει τ&ς π τ:ν κακαν 5ρµ&ς.80
D.S. 1.1.5
And it prepares private citizens to be worthy of leadership, and it encourages leaders to undertake the most glorious of deeds, through the
immortality of their reputation; and apart from that it prepares soldiers to
be more ready for dangers on behalf of their country, by means of the
praises they receive after their death, and by its eternal condemnations
it deters the wicked portion of the people from their impulse to evil.
This sentiment is now generally taken to be Diodorus’ own, and the fact that he
used it in two other prefaces shows that he was genuinely intrigued by it.81 But
it is worth remembering, too, that an earlier chapter of the main preface has a
strong hint of Stoicism, if it is not an outright borrowing from Posidonius.82
Later Diodorus is more explicit about the connection between praise or
denunciation and exempla:

Μνησθσοµα τινων παραδεγµατος Uνεκα κα πανου δικαου κα
το0 τ.K κοιν.K βωK συµφ#ροντος, Vν ο µ2ν πονηρο τ.ν 'νθρ,πων
δι6 τ&ς κατ6 τ:ν στοραν βλασφηµας 'ποτρ#πωνται τ&ς π τ:ν
κακαν 5ρµ&ς, ο δ2 'γαθο δι6 τοCς κ τ&ς α ωνου δξης πανους
'ντ#χεσθαι τ.ν καλ.ν πιτηδευµτων Wρ#γωνται.
D.S. 37.4.1
I will mention some people [or possibly “things”] for the sake of example
and for the just praise that beneﬁts society, so that wicked men will turn
from their pursuit of evil due to history’s condemnation, and so that good
men will be eager to strive for the good due to praises of its eternal glory.
Like Chrysippus, in other words, Diodorus sees that deterrence is as important as inspiration.83 And like Tacitus he suggests that history can turn people into new exempla. These ideas may, as Luce suggests, be something quite
new among ancient justiﬁcations of history.84 But a Stoic like Seneca would
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

I take κα τοCς µ2ν δι,τας to be the beginning of a new sentence.
On the prefaces in Diodorus see Sacks 1990.
Above, n. 67.
Above, section 2.
Luce 1991; see above, pp. 359–60.
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have understood Diodorus and Tacitus at once: of course an historian would
focus on exempla, because readers would be moved to emulate good behavior
and avoid the bad. And exempla would also be useful in ﬁguring out which
was which.
4. EXEMPLA IN TACITUS

There is as yet no comprehensive study of Tacitus’ use of exempla.85 In what
follows we will conﬁne our attention to the central question raised by Tacitus’
statement about the praecipuum munus annalium: I argue that his narratives
conﬁrm that he was interested in the potential of exempla for moral instruction.
And it is surely signiﬁcant that his most obvious exempla are his principal Stoic
characters; Tacitus shows us that diﬃcult and changing circumstances prompted a
variety of appropriate responses in Seneca, Barea Soranus, and Thrasea Paetus,
and he invites us to consider the implications of their decisions for our own lives.
Tacitus’ other exemplary characters function in very similar ways; he ﬁnds useful
exempla in some surprising places.
It is in this context that we should assess Tacitus’ views on whether or not
to cooperate with emperors. Moral decisions are complicated, and Tacitus is clear
that in some circumstances collaboration with the regime could be just as virtuous
as martyrdom; that was his point in the Agricola, and he remains fascinated by
honorable and eﬀective collaborators.86 But his insistence on this point should
not be mistaken for doubts about the validity of withdrawal or resistance, in the
right circumstances. Tacitus goes out of his way to tell us about people who
opposed tyrannical emperors and suﬀered for it, both avowed Stoics and people
who exempliﬁed Stoic principles without even realizing it. And he was just as
interested in people who betrayed those principles. His readers might end up
making diﬀerent decisions about how to deal with emperors, and especially with
tyrants. But with his exempla, whether of inspiration or deterrence, Tacitus was
giving them something to work with.
4.1

 

The most conspicuously heroic of the Stoics in Tacitus are Barea Soranus and
Thrasea Paetus. Tacitus introduces his account of their deaths with a remarkable
declaration:
Trucidatis tot insignibus viris ad postremum Nero virtutem ipsam exscindere concupivit interfecto Thrasea Paeto et Barea Sorano, etc.
Ann. 16.21.1

85. See however Salmon 1989; Feldherr 1998: 218–21; Davies 2004: 145.
86. See section 5 below.
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After the slaughter of so many distinguished men Nero in the end desired
to cut out virtue itself, with the deaths of Thrasea Paetus and Barea
Soranus.87
The phrase virtus ipsa may be a Stoic catch–phrase.88 It is not clear whether
Tacitus makes the comment in his own voice, or whether he attributes it to Nero’s
private ironical thinking, but in either case it is hard not to see the phrase as a
pointed endorsement of Nero’s victims. If we are looking for Tacitean exempla
to inspire emulation, there is no better place to start. Scholars have sometimes
understood Tacitus to be presenting a distinctly jaundiced view of Thrasea.89 But
we should take the words virtus ipsa very seriously: Tacitus is presenting us with
two men about whom, for once, his attitude is completely clear. And as exempla
virtutis they oﬀer more than just inspiration; they also provide case studies, in
how two good men dealt with a tyrant.90
In the case of Barea we are given very little information about his relationship
with the regime prior to his ﬁnal, fatal, encounter. He previously appeared only as
someone willing to work with the regime, proposing rewards for the freedman
Pallas (Ann. 12.53.2). We are given no guidance on how to interpret the proposal,
and on the face of it Tacitus seems to regard Barea as merely another ﬂatterer. But
the fact that Barea is later called virtus ipsa means there is something important to
be learned here. In the right circumstances, it seems, even ﬂattery of someone like
Pallas might be entirely appropriate.
The complicated relationship between Nero and Thrasea is presented in
much more detail; it is here, if anywhere, that Tacitus uses exempla to explore
complicated moral choices. Like Barea, Thrasea ended up as an overt opponent
of the regime, but here too Tacitus shows us that this had not always been the
case. Choices about how to behave under an emperor like Nero were complicated.
Thrasea is introduced to us quite deliberately, in the context of a senatorial
debate on the number of gladiators permitted to the Syracusans:
Non referrem vulgarissimum senatus consultum, quo civitati Syracusanorum egredi numerum edendis gladiatoribus ﬁnitum permittebatur, nisi
Paetus Thrasea contra dixisset praebuissetque materiem obtrectatoribus
arguendae sententiae. cur enim, si rem publicam egere libertate senatoria
crederet, tam levia consectaretur? quin de bello aut pace, de vectigalibus et legibus, quibusque aliis <res> Romana continetur, suaderet dis87. Note also Tac. Hist. 2.91.3: sed Thraseam ad exemplar verae gloriae legisset, “that he had
selected Thrasea as an example of true glory.”
88. Lucian, Vit. Auct. 20 (Hermes, speaking for the Stoics): ατ:ν τ:ν 'ρετ:ν πωλ. (“I’m
selling virtue itself”).
89. Walker 1952: 229: “Thrasea himself is the subject of some of Tacitus’ most taunting
criticisms.” Mellor 1993: 75 claims that Tacitus is suspicious of the “stubborn self-righteousness”
of Thrasea (and of Helvidius Priscus). For contrary views see Martin 1981: 177 and esp. Brunt 1975:
26–27. For a survey of the problem see Städele 1990, who rightly emphasizes the phrase virtus ipsa.
90. Brunt 1975 is an important guide to reading Tacitus as sympathetic to Stoic thought.
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suaderetve? licere patribus, quotiens ius dicendae sententiae accepissent,
quae vellent expromere relationemque in ea postulare. an solum emendatione dignum, ne Syracusis spectacula largius ederentur: cetera per omnes
imperii partes perinde egregia quam si non Nero, sed Thrasea regimen
eorum teneret? quod si summa dissimulatione transmitterentur, quanto
magis inanibus abstinendum! Thrasea contra, rationem poscentibus amicis, non praesentium ignarum respondebat eius modi consulta corrigere,
sed patrum honori dare, ut manifestum ﬁeret magnarum rerum curam non
dissimulaturos, qui animum etiam levissimis adverterent.
Ann. 13.49
I would not mention a very insigniﬁcant senatus consultum, by which the
Syracusans were allowed to exceed the usual limit on gladiators, except
for the fact that Thrasea Paetus opposed it, and thus gave his detractors an
excuse to criticize his vote. For, they said, if he believed that the state
was in need of senatorial freedom, why did he concern himself with such
trivial things? Why did he not take a stand on issues such as war or peace,
taxes or laws, and other things essential to the Roman state? A senator
was permitted, once it was his turn to give his opinion, to explain his point
of view and ask for a vote. Was this the only thing that required correction:
to make sure that the shows in Syracuse not become more extravagant?
Were other things throughout the empire in such good shape, as though it
was Thrasea and not Nero who was in charge of them? Because if he
was going to pass over and ignore the most important things, shouldn’t
he all the more leave the trivial alone? When his friends asked for an
explanation, Thrasea replied that, on the contrary, he was not unaware
of the real state of aﬀairs when he made corrections to such measures. But
he had enough respect for the senators to think that it would be obvious to
them that someone who paid attention even to trivial things would not
ignore the oversight of what was important.
It has been suggested that we are supposed to agree with Thrasea’s detractors;
Bessie Walker thought that their arguments seem more powerful than his reply.91
But the consequences of this reading are serious: we would have to see Thrasea as
not merely ineﬀectual, but downright hypocritical. As Brunt has argued, Thrasea’s
thinking actually provides us with a clear case of Stoic moral reasoning at work.
Stoics were supposed to cooperate in good faith with those around them, as long
as this was not an unacceptable betrayal of moral principle. Each Stoic had his (or
her) own standard for what would be unacceptable: servility appropriate for a slave
would be unacceptable to someone to whom personal freedom was fundamental.
But as long as they could do so without unacceptable compromises, Stoics were
also expected to help improve the societies in which they lived, by doing their
duty. Their participation, at whatever level of moral involvement was appropriate,
made society better, not so much because improvement mattered for its own sake,
91. Walker 1952: 229.
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as because the attempt oﬀered a good example to others; attention to even the
smallest details showed, as Tacitus has now told us, that you were mindful of
the bigger issues.92
Tacitus knows that Thrasea’s moral calculations are not easy ones. Thrasea
presumably did not like having to keep silent on more substantive matters, and
would no doubt have said that the Senate was only a shadow of its former self. But
as readers we are to infer that, at this stage, all is not lost: Thrasea had decided that
the challenges to his sense of duty were not such as to require him to protest or
withdraw, and that his corner of the universe would work more smoothly if he
remained a participant. Tacitus does not explain all this: he merely juxtaposes the
two sides of the debate and invites us to ﬁgure it out. But we are not, I think,
supposed to be in any doubt about the rightness of Thrasea’s actions; he too will
be called virtus ipsa. What we are supposed to think about is what makes him
right.
The next installment of the Thrasea story presents him as a much more
conspicuous opponent of the regime. Nero’s murder of his mother provoked
astonishingly little criticism. Seneca and Burrus, when informed of the ﬁrst murder
attempt, never protested. When Nero was racked with guilt for completing the
murder he was encouraged by the ﬂattery ﬁrst of the praetorian oﬃcers (prompted
by Burrus) and then by public thank oﬀerings in the towns of Campania (Ann.
14.10.2). In Rome the Senate’s reaction to the news was even more encouraging:
thank oﬀerings, celebratory games, a statue of Nero and Minerva in the Senate,
and the declaration that Agrippina’s birthday was to be considered nefas. Thrasea
was the only dissenter:
Thrasea Paetus silentio vel brevi adsensu priores adulationes transmittere
solitus exi<i>t tum senatu, ac sibi causam periculi fecit, ceteris libertatis
initium non praebuit.
Ann. 14.12.1
Thrasea Paetus, who had been in the habit of bypassing earlier expressions
of adulation either in silence or with brief concurrence, at that point
departed from the Senate. He thus put himself into danger: he caused
no stirrings of libertas in others.
Brieﬂy though the incident is discussed, it is clearly intended as a dramatic
counterpoint to the depressing tale of acquiescence that led up to it. Unfortunately
Tacitus’ attitude to Thrasea’s gesture is diﬃcult to pin down, and his Latin is open
to very diﬀerent translations. Many scholars understand Tacitus as suggesting
that what Thrasea did was pointless.93 But Tacitus’ words can also be read as
condemnation not of Thrasea, but of those who failed to respond as they should
92. See esp. Brunt 1975: 26.
93. e.g. Furneaux 1968: ad loc. and p. 80. Walker 1952: 230 accuses Thrasea of “vanity.”
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have.94 For the Stoics the actual eﬀect of an action was anyway not the most
important consideration; what mattered more was that they do the right thing in
the circumstances.95 Thus Tacitus shows us how Thrasea went from quibbling
over minor matters to conspicuously rejecting matricide, and this allows us to
see how the moral calculus can change. Tacitus is troubled by Thrasea’s failure
to have any eﬀect on those around him, but the failure is not Thrasea’s. And where
Thrasea’s contemporaries may not have learned from the exemplum he oﬀered,
Tacitus’ readers are given the chance to do better.
The next Thrasea episode shows him continuing to participate in senatorial
debate, and even having an eﬀect. When the praetor Antistius was convicted of
maiestas, for reciting verses hostile to the emperor, his accusers proposed the
death penalty, but Thrasea argued that the penalty should be reduced to exile and
conﬁscation of property. Tacitus makes it clear that to be persuasive Thrasea had
to be almost egregiously tactful:
ceteris inde adsentientibus, Paetus Thrasea, multo cum honore Caesaris
et acerrime increpito Antistio, non quicquid nocens reus pati mereretur,
id egregio sub principe et nulla necessitate obstricto senatui statuendum
disseruit. carniﬁcem et laqueum pridem abolita, et esse poenas legibus
constitutas, quibus sine iudicum saevitia et temporum infamia supplicia
decernerentur. quin in insula publicatis bonis, quo longius sontem vitam
traxisset, eo privatim miserior<em> et publicae clementiae maximum
exemplum futurum.
Ann. 14.48.3–4
Although the others were in agreement [with the proposed death penalty],
Thrasea Paetus, with praise of the emperor and having savagely attacked
Antistius, argued that it was not what a convicted criminal deserved
to suﬀer that should be decreed under an honorable emperor, when the
Senate was free to think for itself.96 The executioner and the noose had
been abolished long ago, and there were penalties established by the laws
which provided for punishment without judicial savagery or disgrace to
their age. Whereas if sent to an island, with his property conﬁscated,
the longer he dragged out his ﬂawed life the more miserable he would
be personally, and he would provide an important example of oﬃcial
clemency.
At ﬁrst sight the argument seems like mere sycophancy on the part of Thrasea.
But he might well have thought that verses critical of the emperor—at least some

94. Koestermann 1968: 47; Brunt 1975: 331n.143: “I think that Tacitus decries the servility
of the senate rather than Thrasea’s courage.”
95. See e.g. Sen. Tranq. 1.12, quoted above, section 2.6.
96. I take it this is a reasonable translation of nulla necessitate obstricto senatui; it could also
mean that the senate was not facing some crisis.
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verses—were inappropriate; if so, Thrasea’s condemnation of what Antistius had
done was perfectly consistent with his sense of duty.
In the Antistius aﬀair one of the factors that Thrasea presumably took into
account was the possibility that his proposal might actually be accepted. In this
case Tacitus goes on to demonstrate the beneﬁcial eﬀects of Thrasea’s intervention.
Senators were roused to speak in support of his proposal of leniency, and most
of them voted for it:
Libertas Thraseae servitium aliorum rupit, et postquam discessionem
consul permiserat, pedibus in sententiam eius iere, paucis ex<c>eptis,
in quibus adulatione promptissimus fuit A. Vitellius, optimum quemque
iurgio lacessens et respondenti reticens, ut pavida ingenia solent.
Ann. 14.49.1
Thrasea’s freedom [of speech and of conscience] put an end to the servility
of the others, and after the consul had allowed a vote they went over to
his side. There were only a few exceptions, including Aulus Vitellius,
who was the quickest to ﬂatter [the emperor]; he attacked all the good
men with insults and was silent when they responded, as is the way with
cowardly natures.
The consuls were too intimidated to ratify the decree, but they did write to Nero
about it, and he too felt the eﬀects of Thrasea’s inﬂuence. Nero eventually replied
that they could do what they thought best in this case, and although he was clearly
angry, the exemplum was having an eﬀect. Neither the consuls nor Thrasea were
intimidated:
his atque talibus recitatis et oﬀensione manifesta, non ideo aut consules
mutavere relationem aut Thrasea decessit sententia ceterive quae probaverant deseruere, pars, ne principem obiecisse invidiae viderentur, plures
numero tuti, Thrasea sueta ﬁrmitudine animi et ne gloria intercideret.
Ann. 14.49.3
When these sentiments [of Nero] and similar ones were read out, making
his anger very clear, the consuls did not on that account change the motion,
Thrasea did not change his opinion, and the others did not abandon the
decision they had made. For some this was because they did not want
to seem to put the emperor in an invidious position, but for most it was
because there was safety in numbers; for Thrasea it was his customary
steadfastness of mind, and the preservation of his glory.
For once we get a sense of how monarchy could be made to work: the unworthy
impulses of an emperor would be held in check if people—the senators above
all—would speak up and do their duty. Had Thrasea failed to make an impact his
attempt would still have been a virtuous act, but for Tacitus what matters just as
much is the eﬀect that he could have on others. Thrasea’s interest in his own gloria
is not vulgar publicity-seeking, but is an important part of the moral calculus. And

384

 

Volume 27 / No. 2 / October 2008

the historian helps preserve the exemplum of a man saying the right thing at the
right time.
Thrasea continued as an eﬀective senatorial leader, and we next see him
making a suggestion that is adopted almost immediately. Claudius Timarchus,
a wealthy provincial residing in Crete, was prosecuted for a number of reasons,
including the fact that he had boasted of his power over governors; Thrasea
both endorsed the proposed sentence of exile and suggested a solution to the
general problem (Ann. 15.20.2). Tacitus gives us a version of Thrasea’s speech:
he condemned excessive deference to provincials, and suggested abolishing votes
of thanks. What is surprising, given Thrasea’s track record, is the enthusiastic
approval given his proposal in the Senate. There was a technical hitch, since the
consuls pointed out that they could not sanction a new proposal in the midst of
a senatorial trial, but at this point, more surprisingly still, Nero intervened: on
the emperor’s initiative they passed a resolution doing exactly what Thrasea had
suggested (Ann. 15.22.1).
This most conspicuous example of successful cooperation between Thrasea
and the regime was also the last. The next thing to happen in the Annals is the birth
and death of Nero’s baby daughter by Poppaea. The Senate was extravagant in
its celebration of her birth, and in its mourning of her death, and Nero too was
excessively emotional. It is in this context that he revealed, ﬁnally, that Thrasea’s
independence of mind was unacceptable, though he still tried to pretend otherwise:
adnotatum est, omni senatu Antium sub recentem partum eﬀuso, Thraseam prohibitum immoto animo praenuntiam imminentis caedis contumeliam excepisse. secutam dehinc vocem Caesaris ferunt, qua reconciliatum se Thraseae apud Senecam iactaverit, ac Senecam Caesari
gratulatum. unde gloria egregiis viris et pericula gliscebant.
Ann. 15.23.4
It was observed, when the whole Senate poured out to Antium to celebrate
the recent birth, that Thrasea was prevented from coming, and that he
accepted the insult with equanimity, as an announcement of his impending
death. This was, they say, followed by a comment of the emperor, who
supposedly boasted that he and Thrasea had been reconciled, and he was
congratulated on this by Seneca. But from this point on both the glory
and the dangers, for both these worthy men, were increasing.
Nero dissimulated, moving from an open break to an unconvincing claim of
reconciliation. But Tacitus has given us a glimpse of what an accommodation
between such an emperor and a man of principle would have been like. Had Nero
been a diﬀerent person, and had he been surrounded by diﬀerent people, Thrasea,
the Senate, and the emperor could have worked together. If people would only
do their duty, even a regime like Nero’s would have possibilities.
It is the question of duty—understanding it as well as doing it—that drives
much of the long story that concludes the Annals in their present form, and it is
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no accident that the key incidents are speciﬁcally identiﬁed for us as exempla.
We return to the story of Thrasea in 66 , when Tacitus connects him for the
ﬁrst time with Barea Soranus. Though neither man had any connection with
the Pisonian conspiracy, their deaths are presented as a kind of climax to the
murders that the conspiracy provoked, and, as we have seen, they are identiﬁed
now as embodiments of virtus. Tacitus goes on to say that Nero had long hated
both men, particularly Thrasea. Thrasea had walked out of the Senate rather
than participate in discussions of Agrippina’s death. He had annoyed Nero by
getting Antistius’ death sentence reduced to one of exile, and we now learn that
he had been absent from the session in which divine honors had been voted to
the deceased Poppaea.97 Thrasea had also refused to participate in Nero’s new
festival, the Juvenalia; this was thought particularly objectionable because his
principles had not prevented him from singing in a tragedy in his home town
of Padua (Ann. 16.21.1).98 Tacitus does not explain the contradiction, but we
need not assume hypocrisy on Thrasea’s part. Tacitus tells us very clearly that the
festival was very old, going back to Antenor, and we might infer that Thrasea had
simply been fulﬁlling traditional obligations back home, and had been equally
justiﬁed in ignoring Nero’s disgraceful innovation.99
Despite all these reasons for hatred, Nero took no action. The attack on
Thrasea was instigated by Cossutianus Capito, because Thrasea had been behind
his prosecution for extortion (Ann. 16.21.3).100 According to Tacitus, Cossutianus
added to Nero’s existing resentment by portraying Thrasea as a rebel against the
imperial regime, a sort of Brutus of the Neronian age. This rebellion consisted
of withdrawal from public life: Thrasea had dodged the customary oath of oﬃce
at the new year, the state vows, and the sacriﬁces for the emperor and his “celestial
voice.” Moreover he was no longer the dedicated participant in senatorial debates
that he was when we ﬁrst met him; for three years he had been absent from the
Senate, and concerned himself only with private aﬀairs, even as his colleagues
were dealing with allegations of treason.101 His withdrawal from politics was,
according to Cossutianus, already having an impact on others: he had an immediate
circle of henchmen (satellites), who imitated his austere behavior as a way of
criticizing Nero’s self-indulgence, but his inﬂuence extended to the provinces and
the armies (Ann. 16.22.3). Thus Thrasea was having an enormous eﬀect, and had
even more potential, as an exemplum. Moreover, Cossutianus is quite clear that
Thrasea’s inﬂuence was bound up with his Stoicism:
“aut transeamus ad illa instituta, si potiora sunt, aut nova cupientibus
auferatur dux et auctor. ista secta Tuberones et Favonios, veteri quoque rei
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

For Antistius see Ann. 14.48, discussed above; for the honors of Poppaea see Ann. 16.6.3.
Tacitus mentions the Juvenalia at Ann. 14.15.1, without there mentioning Thrasea.
Brunt 1975: 27; see also Linderski 1992.
For the extortion charge see Ann. 13.33.3.
Against Silanus and Vetus, see Ann. 16.7 and 16.10.
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publicae ingrata nomina, genuit. ut imperium evertant, libertatem praeferunt: si perverterint, libertatem ipsam adgredientur. frustra Cassium
amovisti, si gliscere et vigere Brutorum aemulos passurus es.”
Ann. 16.22.4–5
“Let us either go over to their principles, if they are better, or let us
remove the leader and instigator of those who are longing for change.
That sect is the one that produced Tubero and Favonius, names that were
disliked even in the old republic. They parade their libertas in order to
overthrow the empire; and if they do destroy it, they will go on to attack
libertas itself. Getting rid of Cassius was pointless, if you’re going to
allow imitators of the Brutuses to grow more powerful and to ﬂourish.”102
Cossutianus is shown deliberately distorting the Stoic attitude to monarchy; he
omits any reference to Cato, with his very diﬀerent emotional impact, as well
as any explanation of Thrasea’s earlier willingness to cooperate with the regime.
But as readers we can see through such a distorted picture; we are repelled by
the obvious opportunism of Cossutianus, and prompted to reﬂect on why Thrasea
decided at this point to withdraw from political life.
The climax to the stories of both Barea and Thrasea comes with the visit
of Tiridates of Armenia. The enemies of Barea, according to Tacitus, either
wanted the excitement of the visit to obscure what they were doing or—more
likely—wanted to make it clear that Nero was the equal of any eastern monarch in
his ability to destroy important men (Ann. 16.23.2). The entire city gathered to
receive Nero and Tiridates—we note again Tacitus’ interest in the audience for
such moments—but Thrasea was kept from attending. Thrasea kept his spirits
up, however, and he wrote to the emperor asking for an explanation and an
opportunity to defend himself. Nero was excited at the thought that Thrasea
might have confessed to some failing, but he was disappointed: Thrasea’s obvious
integrity—his demeanor, his spirit, and his libertas—was downright frightening
(Ann. 16.24.2). Integrity would get you into trouble with the regime, but it
apparently had an eﬀect on those in charge.
The announcement that Thrasea was to be tried in the Senate presented him
with a dilemma, and he consulted with his friends (Ann. 16.25–26). This indecision
might look at ﬁrst like moral weakness, but the Stoics realized that life was
complicated: the question was not whether one should do one’s duty, but how
to choose among duties that competed with one another. Stoics also recognized
that talking things over with one’s friends could help in sorting things out, and
of course it was standard practice in the Roman world anyway.103 Consultation

102. We were told at Ann. 16.7.1 that the jurist C. Cassius was charged with excessive devotion to
his ancestor.
103. Sen. EM. 109.14–15; Cic. Off . 1.147. See Crook 1955: 4, for consultation as a regular
practice in private aﬀairs.
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did not mean ducking responsibility, and in fact Thrasea ends up making his ﬁnal
decision on his own.
The debate, as presented by Tacitus, explores further the ever-important
question of collaboration and resistance. There were those who argued that a
confrontation would be the best way to have a positive impact. They had no
doubts about Thrasea’s constancy, and what he would say could only enhance
his glory. An honorable death should be a public one, and a confrontation would
impress all ranks of society:
adspiceret populus virum morti obvium, audiret senatus voces quasi ex
aliquo numine supra humanas: posse ipso miraculo etiam Neronem permoveri: sin crudelitati insisteret, distingui certe apud posteros memoriam
honesti exitus ab ignavia per silentium pereuntium.
Ann. 16.25.2
Let the people look at a man who can confront death, let the Senate hear
words more than human, inspired by some divinity. And there was the
possibility that even Nero might be moved by this very miracle; and if
he persists in his cruelty, our descendants will at least be able to see the
diﬀerence between the memory of an honorable death and the cowardice
of those who perish in silence.
The argument is a powerful one, touching on some of the most central questions
in Tacitus, and in Stoicism: how you die, and how your behavior aﬀects others,
including future generations.
But of course this is only one side of the debate; there were other ways to
inﬂuence the regime, and there were other relationships that would be aﬀected
by Thrasea’s behavior. Confrontation, it was suggested, might prompt others to
join the prosecution, and it would be better if they were spared that temptation;
Nero was not going to change his mind, and he might be provoked to take revenge
on Thrasea’s wife, daughter, and other family members. Above all, avoiding a
confrontation would lead to a death that, in its own way, was even more glorious:
proinde intemeratus, impollutus, quorum vestigiis et studiis vitam duxerit, eorum
gloria peteret finem (Ann. 16.26.3: “And thus, undeﬁled and unpolluted, he should
seek a death that has the glory of those in whose footsteps and studies he spent his
life”). Tacitus seems to admire the second of these options more, but he does not
want us to think the decision was an easy one.
The debate among Thrasea’s friends is complicated by the fact that the young
Arulenus Rusticus, another Stoic, presented a third option: he oﬀered to use his
tribunician veto to confront the regime himself:
aderat consilio Rusticus Arulenus, ﬂagrans iuvenis, et cupidine laudis
oﬀerebat se intercessurum senatus consulto: nam plebi tribunus erat. cohibuit spiritus eius Thrasea: ne vana et reo non profutura, intercessori
exitiosa inciperet. sibi actam aetatem, et tot per annos continuum vitae
ordinem non deserendum: illi initium magistratuum et integra quae su-
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persint. multum ante secum expenderet, quod tali in tempore capessendae
rei publicae iter ingrederetur.
Ann. 16.26.4–5
Arulenus Rusticus, a passionate young man, was also present at this
discussion. Out of a desire for praise he oﬀered to veto the senatus
consultum, for he was a tribune of the plebs. Thrasea restrained his ardor,
on the grounds that it would be an empty gesture and of no use to the
defendant, and would bring destruction to the person who made the veto.
He himself (said Thrasea) had lived out his time, and it would not be right
to abandon a way of life that had been consistent for so many years; but
that young man had his whole magisterial career and the rest of his life
before him. He should think long and hard about what path to take at such
a diﬃcult time for anyone beginning public life.
In calling attention to Arulenus’ youth Tacitus is perhaps alluding to the fact that
Rusticus was later to write Thrasea’s biography, and would be executed for doing
so.104 But his readers will have felt a particular connection with a man who, as
Tacitus reminds them, was their contemporary.
Whatever the merits of Arulenus’ later career, it seems clear that we are
supposed to see his proposal at this stage as ﬂawed: Arulenus is described as
over-eager (flagrans) and motivated by a desire for praise (cupidine laudis). This
hints at the underlying moral logic, but still requires us to think it through: why
shouldn’t Arulenus have done as he proposed? Tacitus draws our attention to
the fact that two men were in very diﬀerent situations.105 If, we might think,
Arulenus had been conﬁdent that his duties as tribune required him to veto the
Senate’s action, Thrasea would presumably have encouraged him to do so, but
instead he suggested thinking carefully about the balance between resistance and
cooperation. And Tacitus encourages his readers to do the same, pointing out that
Thrasea in the end went away to think things over for himself (Ann. 16.26.5).
At this point the scene shifts to the Senate, where a speech from Nero argues
that senators like Thrasea who withdraw from their duties set, of all things, a
bad example (Ann. 16.27.2). This prompts attacks on Thrasea by Cossutianus and
then by Eprius Marcellus, whose speech is reported in detail; it mentions by name
the most prominent Stoic opponents of the regime, and suggests that Thrasea by
his withdrawal from public life is actually harming the state (Ann. 16.28). The
senators are portrayed as sympathetic to Thrasea and the others, whom they see as
completely innocent, but they are also intimidated, not just by Marcellus himself,
but by armed soldiers.106
But if the senators could be intimidated, others could not. The story of
Barea Soranus resumes at this point, with two rather unexpected heroes, Soranus’
104. See Tac. Agr. 2.1; Syme 1958: 298.
105. Brunt 1975: 15.
106. Tac. Ann. 16.29.1: Tacitus places discussion of the senators’ fear before his discussion of
their sympathy for the victims, but this is one of his characteristic inversions for rhetorical purposes.
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daughter Servilia, and a rich provincial named Cassius Asclepiodotus. There is
also a spectacular betrayal by an avowed Stoic named Publius Egnatius. Servilia,
accused of dabbling in treasonous magic, explained that she was innocent, but
stressed above all that her father was not involved (Ann. 16.31). Barea was no less
determined to take all the blame, and the two of them presented a heart-breaking
spectacle of family loyalty (Ann. 16.32.1).
This made even more conspicuous the betrayal of Publius Egnatius, who
testiﬁed against one or both of them, for money, even though Barea was his
patron. This man, says Tacitus, was a Stoic and a fraud, who pretended to be
an honorable man but was in fact deceitful, avaricious, and lustful. And once
he was rich enough to indulge his tastes, he became an exemplum himself, of
what not to become (dedit exemplum praecavendi); he showed that deceitful
friends pretending to be good could be just as bad as obviously wicked people
(Ann. 16.32.3). Asclepiodotus, on the other hand, was a rich Bithynian, who had
honored Barea previously and was not going to desert him now; his resolution
made him an honestum exemplum (Ann. 16.33.1).
The importance of Thrasea as an exemplum is brought home with particular
force by his last moments. The arresting oﬃcer ﬁnds him in suitably philosophic
conversation with friends and family, but Thrasea sends most of them away for
their own safety. His wife Arria wanted to stay and die with him, because she
wanted to follow the exemplum of her mother, who had died along with her
husband.107 In this case, however, there were other considerations, and Thrasea
urges her to leave so that their daughter would not be orphaned (Ann. 16.34).108
Thrasea is here presented as someone acutely aware of his own role as an
exemplum.109 And Tacitus is clearly focused on those who can proﬁt most from
Thrasea’s example. Thrasea’s last words are to the young quaestor who delivered
the senatorial decree:
propius vocato quaestore “libamus” inquit “Iovi liberatori. specta, iuvenis; et omen quidem dii prohibeant, ceterum in ea tempora natus es
quibus ﬁrmare animum expediat constantibus exemplis.”
Ann. 16.35.1
and calling the quaestor closer he said, “We are making a libation to
Jupiter the Liberator. Look, young man: may the Gods avert the omen,
but you have been born into times when it may be useful to strengthen
resolve with exempla of constancy.”
As with Arulenus Rusticus the text looks forward to a future generation.

107. Her mother, Arria Maior, had died in 42 along with her husband Caecina Paetus, accused
of conspiring against Claudius (Dio 60.16.6); she was famous for her last words, Paete, non dolet
(Martial 1.14; Pliny, Ep. 3.16.6).
108. The daughter, Fannia, was married at the time to Helvidius Priscus. She was still alive in
Tacitus’ day (Pliny Ep. 7.19).
109. See Chaplin 2000 for the self-consciousness of exempla.
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While Thrasea and Barea are carefully identiﬁed as virtus ipsa, Seneca is
a more equivocal ﬁgure. Tacitus’ examination of his career and his death is an
obvious counterpart to his account of Thrasea’s thoughtful but heroic Stoic career,
and Seneca’s reputation, at least in modern times, has not always survived the
comparison. Some scholars (especially English-speaking ones) have seen irony,
and even sarcasm, in Tacitus’ account of a man who acquired immense wealth
and inﬂuence as Nero’s advisor, but died a death that was so conspicuously that
of a philosopher.110 But it is important to notice that Tacitus comes close to an
endorsement of Seneca, identifying him as Thrasea’s companion in danger: unde
gloria egregiis viris et pericula gliscebant (Ann. 15.23.4: “But after this both the
glory and the dangers were increasing for these worthy men”).111
It is no surprise that a Stoic, try though he might, did not achieve the moral
heights of a sapiens, and Seneca himself was appealingly modest about his own
success in that regard. And for Tacitus the crucial thing was surely that Seneca
was in a very diﬀerent position from that of Thrasea: as an advisor to Nero his
duty, as a Stoic, was to make the regime as successful as possible without violating
his principles. It is easy from a distance to condemn people in this situation, but
the Stoics did not allow themselves such easy answers: individual conscience
mattered, of course, but so did helping others, and Tacitus gives us a Seneca who
tried to do what was required of him given his unique situation. In the end Seneca
had to give up, and Tacitus shows us how he arrived at this decision, and how
he dealt with its consequences.
As he begins his account of the reign of Nero Tacitus emphasizes that it was
Seneca and Burrus who kept things from being worse than they were. Agrippina
was responsible for two deaths at the outset, he says, but there would have been
more if Seneca and Burrus had not been there to counteract her inﬂuence:
Ibaturque in caedes, nisi Afranius Burrus et Annaeus Seneca obviam
issent. hi rectores imperatoriae iuventae et, rarum in societate potentiae,
concordes, diversa arte ex aequo pollebant, Burrus militaribus curis et
severitate morum, Seneca praeceptis eloquentiae et comitate honesta,
iuvantes in vicem, quo facilius lubricam principis aetatem, si virtutem
aspernaretur, voluptatibus concessis retinerent.
Ann. 13.2.1
And there would have been more murders, if Afranius Burrus and Annaeus Seneca had not intervened. These men guided the youthful emperor
with a harmony not often found when there is a division of power, each
man being equally eﬀective in diﬀerent areas: Burrus had military expertise and a personal austerity, Seneca provided rhetorical instruction
110. For useful surveys see Griﬃn 1992: 441–44; Brinkmann 2002: 1–4.
111. The passage is quoted above, section 4.1.
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and the companionship of an upright man; each one helped in turn to
restrain the emperor’s youthful susceptibility, should he reject virtue, by
granting him certain pleasures.
Whatever the attractions of moral absolutes, Seneca was not in a position to wash
his hands of the regime; his duty, as a Stoic, was to do as much for his fellow
citizens as was consistent with his own sense of integrity. And thus he was often
forced to choose the lesser of two evils, in the interests of better government.
He countered Agrippina’s sexual oﬀensive by encouraging Nero’s aﬀair with the
freedwoman Acte (Ann. 13.13; 14.2). And together with Burrus he tried to satisfy
Nero with private chariot racing, to avoid the more public scandal of going on
stage; they failed, but it is hard to blame them for trying (Ann. 14.14).
Seneca’s most spectacular moral compromise was prompted by the plot to
murder Agrippina. Nero was paralyzed with fear when he learned that his plan
had failed, and his only hope was that Seneca and Burrus could think of a way out.
The two advisors had perhaps not known about the plot, and when Nero consulted
them they needed time to think:
quos statim acciverat, incertum an et ante ignaros. igitur longum utriusque
silentium, ne inriti dissuaderent, an eo descensum credebant, <ut>, nisi
praeveniretur Agrippina, pereundum Neroni esset.
Ann. 14.7.2–3
He had summoned them immediately, though it is unclear whether or not
they had known of the plot in advance. Each man was silent for a long
time, either because they thought they would fail to get Nero to change
his mind or because they thought that it had reached the point that Nero
would have to die unless Agrippina were stopped.
By explicitly including their pause for thought Tacitus signals that their dilemma
is a very real one. A modern reader presumably thinks that this was the moment for
them to decide that enough was enough; like Thrasea, they could have withdrawn
their support from an emperor who had now descended to matricide. But Tacitus
may be asking simply for us to reﬂect on the situation. The two advisors were in a
diﬃcult position. They would still be in a position to exercise a positive inﬂuence,
at least in some matters, as long as Nero did not feel betrayed by them now. And
a living Nero, however imperfectly restrained, was still preferable to the civil war
that would be caused by his death. Tacitus can admire Thrasea for doing his duty
as a senator and walking out, and he can condemn sycophants. But an advisor
who might be able to restrain his emperor has a more complicated moral calculus
to do, at least when the alternative is no restraint at all. By contrast, an advisor
who is ignored has a very diﬀerent set of obligations, and Seneca withdraws from
imperial service, ﬁnally, once he can no longer be of any use (Ann. 14.52.1).
Tacitus is clearly interested in the fact that some people saw Seneca’s support
of Nero as merely self-serving. Seneca is said to have written the speeches Nero
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gave to explain his pardon of Plautius Lateranus, and he did this, according to
Tacitus, either to show the world that the advice he was providing was honorable,
or simply to show oﬀ (Ann. 13.11.2). More sinister still was the suggestion that
it was Seneca’s eloquence that was responsible for Nero’s appalling account of his
mother’s murder (Ann. 14.11.3). But as readers we are not required to endorse
these criticisms. Certainly Seneca’s later critics are not people we admire; Seneca
is attacked after his retirement by the odious Suillius and his loathsome advisors
(Ann. 13.42).
Tacitus presents the dying Seneca as preoccupied with his own role as an
exemplum. Modern readers have found the scene laden with irony; Seneca is
sometimes seen as too theatrical and too self-conscious an imitator of Socrates to
be taken seriously as a martyr.112 But Tacitus portrays Seneca reﬂecting on his
own career, and we are invited to reﬂect upon it as well. Denied the right to make
a will, Seneca told his friends that all he could leave them was the story of his own
life (imaginem vitae suae relinquere testatur), from which they would be able
to proﬁt (Ann. 15.62.1). He ends up yielding precedence as an exemplum to his
wife Paulina, when she insists on trying to die alongside him, but that discussion
serves simply to emphasize the importance of the issue:
tum Seneca gloriae eius non adversus, simul amore, ne sibi unice dilectam
ad iniurias relinqueret, “vitae” inquit “delenimenta monstraveram tibi, tu
mortis decus mavis: non invidebo exemplo. sit huius tam fortis exitus
constantia penes utrosque par, claritudinis plus in tuo ﬁne.”
Ann. 15.63.2
Then Seneca objected no more to her acquisition of glory, and he was also
prompted by love, not wanting to abandon a woman he loved so well to
insults. “I had shown you the consolations of life,” he said, “but you have
chosen the distinction of death; I will not begrudge you your opportunity
to be an exemplum. I hope that each of us will be equally brave in the face
of death, but your end will be the more famous.”
All of this has a poignancy for its own sake, not really diminished by the fact
that Tacitus adds that Paulina actually survived her husband by a few years.113
In showing us a Seneca preoccupied with the question of exempla to the very
end, Tacitus rounds out the complicated story of his political and philosophical
choices. Seneca’s career, like Thrasea’s, could help readers think more clearly
about productive collaboration, and its limits.
112. E.g. Dyson 1970; Henry and Walker 1963: 109: “The attitude of Seneca to his coming death
is so priggish and his commonplaces so devastatingly banal that the reader may feel that Seneca
almost deserved death for his loquacity and dullness.” For more positive readings see Martin 1981:
184; Syme 1970: 138: “But it would be an error to suppose that Tacitus means any depreciation
of Seneca. He accords him a proper recognition—the much-maligned who none the less did his best
in an impossible situation.”
113. On the importance of Paulina see Reydams-Schils 2005: 171–75.
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Although the exempla explored in greatest depths are Stoics, Tacitus also tells
us about people who act on Stoic principles without being Stoics themselves. Thus
Burrus, not previously identiﬁed as having philosophic interests, utters as his last
words a phrase associated with a Stoic’s good death.114 Similarly, the conspiracy
of Piso and its aftermath receives so much attention, it seems, because of the
impressive number of death scenes.115 One of the most memorable deaths, that
of the freedwoman Epicharis, is said to be a particularly impressive exemplum,
in that she had a moral strength lacking in those more privileged by sex and social
status (Ann. 15.57.2). Similarly, it is two soldiers, Subrius Flavus and Sulpicius
Asper, who have the moral courage to tell Nero to his face what they think of
him, and each is singled out as an exemplum constantiae (Ann. 15.68.1). Like
Seneca, Tacitus apparently believes that some of the most powerful exempla are
those oﬀered by people in whom such strength of mind would not normally be
expected.116
In other instances we are given less help in deciding what to think. The
crucial things for Tacitus, in some cases, are dying in a way that does no harm
to others, and dying in a way that is true to one’s identity. It is utterly appropriate,
for example, that Flavus remains the stern disciplinarian to the last, telling his
executioners to dig better and strike harder, and it is for the same reason, perhaps,
that we are told that Epicharis dies in her litter and strangles herself with her
underwear (Ann. 15.57). Although the death of Petronius is not explicitly called
an exemplum, and we are not even told that it is admirable in any way, we are
surely supposed to respect the integrity of a hedonist who takes his own life in the
most relaxed and pleasurable way possible, at the same time protecting others
(Ann. 16.18–19). It may be, too, that Lucan to some extent redeems himself, after
betraying his own mother, by dying as the proud author of a great poem (Ann.
15.70). Like Seneca, again, Tacitus seems to have thought that a good death could
outweigh earlier moral failure.117
The Neronian books are to some extent a special case, since Tacitus’ sources
seem to have included a partisan biography of Thrasea and the works of Seneca
himself, as well as Stoic accounts of the the deaths of prominent men.118 But
Tacitus reveals a similar preoccupation with exempla in the introduction to his
Histories. His subject matter, he tells us, required descriptions of terrible events,
and of despicable behavior at all levels of society (Hist. 1.2), but that was not all:

114. For ego me bene habeo (“I’m doing very well”) see the account of Metellus Scipio in Sen.
EM. 24.9, discussed above, section 2.2.
115. Tac. Ann. 15.49; 15.70; cf. 16.16.
116. Above, section 2.2.
117. Above, section 2.4. See also the death of Otho, discussed at the end of this paper.
118. Marx 1937/38; Ronconi 1940; Bellardi 1974; Sage 1990: 1016–17.
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Non tamen adeo virtutum sterile saeculum, ut non et bona exempla prodiderit. comitatae profugos liberos matres, secutae maritos in exilia coniuges; propinqui audentes, constantes generi, contumax etiam adversus
tormenta servorum ﬁdes; supremae clarorum virorum necessitates, ipsa
necessitas fortiter tolerata et laudatis antiquorum mortibus pares exitus.
Tac. Hist. 1.3.1
But the age were was not so barren of virtues that it did not also produce
good exempla. Mothers accompanied their children when they ﬂed, wives
followed their husbands into exile; relatives were steadfast, sons-in-law
were stalwart, and the loyalty of slaves was strong even in the face of
torture; famous men met the ultimate challenges with courage, and their
deaths were the equal of those famous among the ancients.
Here Tacitus seems simply to assume that exempla would be something his readers
expected to ﬁnd in his work: he was interested in bad exempla as well as good
ones, he could ﬁnd them in surprising places (such as women and slaves), and
he paid particular attention to the manner of their deaths.
Thus when a Ligurian woman refuses to betray her son she is singled out as
a praeclarum exemplum (Hist. 2.13.2).119 And the wife of Vitellius provides an
exemplum of restraint when she refuses to join her sister-in-law in vindictiveness
(Hist. 2.64.2). Tacitus also promises to tell us, in its proper place, the story of
how Sabinus evaded capture, about the constantia of Sabinus’ friends, and the
famous exemplum of his wife (Hist. 4.67.2). And he puts into the mouth of Curtius
Montanus a striking invocation of the importance of mala exempla. Montanus was
bitterly opposed to a proposal to go easy on Regulus for collaborating with Nero,
and rejected the notion that it would be safe for Regulus to go unpunished: people
who do evil and get caught are already dangerous enough, as exempla; what would
happen if they started getting away with it?120 And, he continues, we should not
think that mala exempla will be harmless under a good emperor like Vespasian,
because they will survive to do their evil work in less happy times.121
In the Annals, outside the Neronian books, Tacitus rarely identiﬁes moral
exempla explicitly, and when he does it is to draw attention to reprehensible
behavior, by collaborators with the regime. In introducing us to the ﬁrst of the
odious informers so prominent in the Annals, Caepio Crispinus, Tacitus provides
119. Tacitus presumably heard of this incident through his family connections, see Tac. Agr. 7.
120. Hist. 4.42.5: “retinete, patres conscripti, et reservate hominem tam expediti consilii, ut
omnis aetas instructa sit, et quo modo senes nostri Marcellum, Crispum, iuvenes Regulum imitentur.
invenit aemulos etiam infelix nequitia: quid si floreat vigeatque?” “Preserve and protect, fathers,
a man of such useful advice that the whole age can be ediﬁed by it, and, as just recently our
elders imitated Marcellus and Crispus, let our young men imitate Regulus. Even an unsuccessful
wickedness ﬁnds emulators; what will happen if wickedness is to prosper and ﬂourish?”
121. Hist. 4.42.6: “non timemus Vespasianum: ea principis aetas, ea moderatio; sed diutius
durant exempla quam mores,” “We have no fear of Vespasian, such is the emperor’s age and
moderation. But exempla last longer than anyone’s morals.” Note that Wellesley 1989 reads durant
exempla quam imperatores, which makes the same point more explicitly.
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us with a thumbnail indictment of his career, which had encouraged all the other
informers: Crispinus was an exemplum of the horrors of upward mobility, because
a poor and powerless man had become rich and inﬂuential (Ann. 1.74.1–2). Even
more loathsome was the younger Vibius Serenus, who cheerfully and eloquently
prosecuted his own father for maiestas, thus providing an exemplum atrox (Ann.
4.28.1: “a horrifying exemplum”). The last in this depressing series is L. Vitellius,
who despite his later reputation had under Tiberius been a good administrator; it
was only later that, corrupted by his fear of Gaius and his friendship with Claudius,
he was an exemplar of disgraceful ﬂattery (Ann. 6.32.4).
Tacitus’ accounts of Seneca, Barea, and Thrasea are his most elaborate
explorations of moral decision-making. But the brief accounts of others behaving
in ways worthy of emulation, or the opposite, ﬁll out the picture: the basic
principles are important for all of us, whether we are Stoics or not.
5. TACITUS AND THE STOICS

I have argued that we should take Tacitus seriously when he claims that
exempla are an important part of history. Whether or not it is helpful to think
of “Stoic history,” Stoic ideas about moral teaching at least help explain why
exempla were so useful: people often lack the insight to make the right choices, or
the strength to stick to them, and reﬂecting on the actions of others could help
on both fronts. And it is surely no coincidence that the most elaborate exempla
in the Annals involve three prominent Stoics.
Tacitus is often said to have disliked Stoicism as a doctrine, and Stoics as
a breed. As we have seen, some scholars see his accounts of Seneca, and even of
Thrasea, as hostile; instead of stubborn opposition to the regime, it is said, Tacitus
preferred the more cooperative approach of his father-in-law.122 Even scholars who
accept that the portraits of Thrasea and Seneca are positive see Tacitus as distinguishing between their personal virtues and their doctrinal aﬃliation.123 Certainly
few would entertain the notion that Tacitus was seriously committed to Stoicism.124
But it is worth noting that the tangible arguments advanced against Stoic
sympathies are not strong. For example, the fact that Tacitus never declares an
allegiance to Stoicism means little; neither Posidonius or Arrian ever identiﬁes
himself as a Stoic in what we have of their historical writing, which in Arrian’s

122. Mellor 1993: 50: “he was deeply distrustful of philosophers, and hardly derived his moral
standards from philosophy.” Grilli 1995: 61: “Tacito non ama gli stoici che fanno politica; potrei
anche dire che non ama i politici che s’avvolgono nel manto del stoicismo.” In general see André
1991.
123. Murray 1965: 59: “If Tacitus praised the characters of certain of the Stoics, and on occasion
their actions, he did not approve of their general attitude.”
124. Syme 1958: 527n.1 is noncommittal and uninterested: “If many features in the make-up
of Tacitus (as of other educated Romans) be described as ‘Stoic,’ that does not take one very far,
or very deep.”
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case at least is substantial. And it is equally inconclusive that Tacitus at times
voices distinctly un-Stoic doubts about the beneﬁcence of Providence: Stoics
were remarkably tolerant of human frailty, including their own, and similar doubts
appear in both Seneca and Marcus Aurelius.125 Tacitus’ views about fate, fortune,
and the gods have been much discussed, but it is suﬃcient here to recall that he
seems to assume that history involves the unrolling of a divine plan; his emphasis
on predictions that come true, even astrological ones, suggests that his questioning
of Providence is more rhetorical strategy than serious theological speculation.126
It should go without saying that Tacitus’ contempt for Publius Egnatius, the
Stoic poseur, does not suggest hostility to the real thing.127 Nor need we be troubled
by Tacitus’ reservations about devoting one’s life to philosophy. Agricola, he says,
would have gone in for it with an unbecoming intensity, had it not been for his
mother’s restraining inﬂuence (Agr. 4.3). But such moderation, and the attention
to what was appropriate to a given station in life, is something that plenty of Stoics
(at least the Roman ones) would have applauded, and Marcus explicitly says that
he was thankful he had resisted the temptations of philosophy.128
It is this Stoic emphasis on the diﬀerences in our circumstances that oﬀers
a possible approach to Tacitus’ famous outburst near the end of the Agricola,
about the diﬀerence between productive collaboration and futile resistance. Tacitus wrote his biography to show how a man might live a useful and even glorious
life under an emperor as oppressive as Domitian; Agricola of course is one of
Tacitus’ most important exempla, even if he is never called one. But Tacitus also
considers alternatives:
sciant, quibus moris est inlicita mirari, posse etiam sub malis principibus
magnos viros esse, obsequiumque ac modestiam, si industria et vigor
adsint, eo laudis excedere, quo plerique per abrupta sed in nullum rei
publicae usum ambitiosa morte inclaruerunt.
Agr. 42.4
Let it be clear to those who insist on admiring disobedience that even
under bad emperors men can be great, and that a decent regard for
authority, if backed by industry and energy, can reach that peak of
distinction which most men attain only by following a perilous course,
winning fame, without beneﬁting their country, by an ostentatious selfmartyrdom. (Mattingly’s translation)
Many scholars have understood this as a rejection of the Stoics who had been
so conspicuous in their opposition to Domitian.129 If so, we are faced with two
125. Sen. Cons. Helv. 8.3; EM. 16.5; M. Ant. 2.11.
126. See, in general, Theiler 1946; Scott 1968; Davies 2004.
127. Tac. Ann. 16.32.3, discussed above, section 4.1. Seneca reveals a similar hostility to
professed Stoics who give the sect a bad name: EM. 123.15.
128. M. Ant. 1.17; see also Sen. Helv. 17.4; Epict. 1.22.18.
129. e.g. Furneaux 1922: ad loc. and introd. xxx. Shotter 1991: 3270: “That the plerique
were men like the Stoic Helvidius Priscus can hardly be doubted: of course Tacitus admired their
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choices: either our reading of the Neronian narrative is implausible, or else Tacitus
simply changed his mind, and came to admire the confrontational approach to
tyranny that he rejected in his ﬁrst years as a historian. But Stoic thought suggests
that in fact there is no contradiction at all. The Stoics recognized that we are not all
constituted alike, and that our circumstances can be very diﬀerent. Thrasea oﬀered
a valid response to tyranny, and Agricola oﬀered another one. Indeed Tacitus has
Arruntius make much the same point: non eadem omnibus decora (Ann. 6.48.1:
“diﬀerent people have diﬀerent ways of distinguishing themselves”).
In Tacitus’ view, then, it was right for some people to resist and for others
to cooperate, and his outburst about Agricola should be read with this in mind. He
was certainly not hostile to authentic Stoic heroes; not the least of Domitian’s
outrages, he says, was his attempt to destroy all copies of the biographies of
Thrasea and Helvidius (Agr. 2.1). Rather, he has no patience for the people who
talked mindlessly about such men when they, and the tyrants, were long gone.130
Such people needed reminding that in some circumstances resistance was not the
appropriate option.
If we consciously resist the temptation to read the passage as a condemnation,
it can appear very diﬀerent:
Let it be clear to those who so regularly131 praise resistance132 that
even under bad emperors men can be great, and that a decent regard
for authority, if backed by industry and energy, can reach that peak of
distinction where most men, after choices that were perilous but had little
eﬀect on the state,133 gained renown by a resolute death.134

bravery and their adherence to their principles even though he evidently regarded those principles as
mistaken: for in the last analysis, what did they achieve beyond their own martyrdom?”
130. So, rightly, Birley 1999: ad loc; see also Syme 1958: 25: “Tacitus proclaims his scorn for the
brave enemies of dead tyrants, the noisy advocates of the heroes and martyrs.”
131. quibus moris est. Translations such as “make a habit of,” or “insist on” (Mattingly 1970)
convey a sense of disapproval, but there is nothing about the Latin itself that suggests this; the phrase
can mean simply “those people who regularly do something.”
132. inlicita mirari. It is tempting to read this as a condemnation, since admiration for illegality
at ﬁrst looks distinctly immoral. But scholars agree that illicita means not “things that are illegal” in
the traditional sense (and certainly not “things that are immoral”), but rather “things that the emperor
has decided should be prohibited.”
133. per abrupta sed in nullum rei publicae usum. This is the crucial phrase. As with the
comment on Thrasea’s reaction to the murder of Agrippina (Ann. 14.12.1; see above, section 4.1), it
is tempting to understand Tacitus as claiming that opposition is not only dangerous but unhelpful.
But it is possible that in nullum rei publicae usum is not as judgmental as it might appear. In the
ﬁrst place, usus is not the same as utilitas. Whereas utilitas is unambiguously positive, like our word
“utility,” usus can mean simply that something is being used; contrast Cic. Off . 3.30: qui multam
utilitatem rei publicae . . . afferre possis (“you who are able to be very useful to the state”) with
Tac. Hist. 4.60: quae profana foedaque in usum necessitas vertit (“which [animals] low and foul
necessity turned to use”). Second, we should remember that failure is not necessarily the fault of the
person who fails. As at Ann. 14.12.1, on Thrasea’s walking out of the Senate, Tacitus may mean
that glorious deeds should have been useful, but weren’t (above, n. 94).
134. ambitiosa morte inclaruerunt. We tend to read ambitiosa as distinctly hostile, casting doubt
on the sincerity of the resistance and thus on their fame. But we should remember that inclaresco and
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The fact that the resistance of the Stoics was not often emulated by others is
certainly a crucial point, and was no doubt one reason Tacitus was so interested
in an alternative. But for Tacitus, as for the Stoics themselves, the question of
practical eﬀectiveness was of secondary importance. If observers could not proﬁt
from the example of people like Thrasea, that was perhaps disappointing, but it
did not diminish their glory. Later generations might do better.
6. CONCLUSION

Not all exempla, of course, had to be labeled; Tacitus’ narrative abounds in
characters whose behaviors make them worthy of imitation or censure, or who
oﬀer useful material for moral reﬂection.135 Of all these “unidentiﬁed” exempla
one of the most illuminating is Marcus Lepidus, singled out by Tacitus as a man
able to negotiate the perils of friendship with an emperor and use his position
for the common good:
hunc ego Lepidum temporibus illis gravem et sapientem virum fuisse
comperior: nam pleraque ab saevis adulationibus aliorum in melius ﬂexit.
neque tamen temperamenti egebat, cum aequabili auctoritate et gratia
apud Tiberium viguerit. unde dubitare cogor, fato et sorte nascendi, ut
cetera, ita principum inclinatio in hos, oﬀensio in illos, an sit aliquid
in nostris consiliis liceatque inter abruptam contumaciam et deforme
obsequium pergere iter ambitione ac periculis vacuum.
Ann. 4.20.2–3
I ﬁnd that this Lepidus was, in those times, a serious and wise man:
for he turned most of the things stemming from the savage fawning of
others into something better. But he was also not without tact, and could
ﬂourish with his moral authority unimpaired and the approval of Tiberius.
Which compels me to wonder whether it is fate and the random chances
of birth, as with other things, that causes emperors to favor some people
and to be hostile to others, or whether this rests to some extent on our
own decisions, and whether it is not possible to tread a path between
obnoxious obstinacy and disgraceful submission, free from ambition and
its dangers.
Like the Agricola, this raises what is perhaps the most important issue in Tacitus: it
was not always easy, under the principate, to know what to do. Certain behaviors,
of course, were obviously admirable, and others were obviously reprehensible, and
could usefully oﬀer inspiration or deterrence. But most Romans were in a much
more equivocal position: resistance might in some circumstances be unavoidable,
claritas, like gloria, are unambiguously positive words. And ambitiosus need not imply that the
death in question is self-interested and hypocritical; the word can mean simply “resolute.”
135. For exempla without labels see e.g. Tac. Hist. 1.43; 4.42.5; Ann. 1.53; 1.74; 2.34; 2.40;
3.49; 3.50; 11.12.
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and therefore right, but sometimes collaboration might be more helpful. Tacitus’
job as a historian was, as he saw it, to provide a range of exempla: his readers
could reﬂect on the exempla, good and bad, to help them ﬁgure out what they
ought to do.
Tacitus has more to say about this question in another digression on the nature
of his subject (Ann. 4.32.2–4.33.2). Apologizing for the apparently trivial nature
of the the events he is reporting, he admits that compared to the Roman past his
own material is simply inferior. But, he continues, even events that seem trivial
at ﬁrst sight can actually turn out to be important, because in the end they can help
us deal with the emperors. In former times, when the state had been under the
control of ﬁrst the People and then the Senate, the key to success had been an
understanding of each of those political groups. But in his own day the situation
was completely diﬀerent:
sic converso statu neque alia rerum <salute> quam si unus imperitet,
haec conquiri tradique in rem fuerit, quia pauci prudentia honesta ab
deterioribus, utilia ab noxiis discernunt, plures aliorum eventis docentur.
Ann. 4.33.2
Now that things have changed and the only safety is if one person is in
charge, it will be useful to investigate these things and to report them,
since few people have the innate wisdom to distinguish good things from
bad ones, and useful things from harmful ones: most people learn this
from events that happen to others.
Once again Tacitus has connected his goals as a historian with an educational
mission. Understanding relationships with emperors is the key to success in a
monarchy, and the key to making the monarchy a success. And since most people
need help, a historian can usefully provide guidance in identifying what is good
and what is not.
Whether Tacitus imagined that emperors themselves would proﬁt from his
exempla is less clear. Emperors were the most obvious people to learn from
Tacitus’ explorations of the imperial character, to be inspired or deterred by
the thought that historians were there to preserve their memory. But Tacitus is
certainly not explicit about this, whether because it would have been tactless
or because his real interest was in the inﬂuence on emperors exerted by other
people. In what may be pure professional fantasy, however, he does present Otho
as concerned in defeat with with how future generations will remember him: in
removing himself from the scene, for the good of others, he will be yet another
exemplum (Hist. 2.47.2).
Historical writing for exemplary purposes is not much to the modern taste. It
goes against the grain to place Tacitus in the company of a notorious moralizer like
Mason Locke Weems, who wrote his famous biography of George Washington so
that children could emulate his private virtues along with his public ones: “Give
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us his private virtues! In these, every youth is interested, because in these every
youth may become a Washington.”136
But exempla are more interesting and more eﬀective than we usually think.
Even the famous cherry tree exemplum, apparently invented by “Parson” Weems
for the ediﬁcation of American youth, makes a serious point about the trust that can
exist between a father and a son, and could in theory prompt useful reﬂection.137
Tacitus was writing in a more diﬃcult political environment, for readers who
might have to make decisions about how to deal with tyranny. Rightly or wrongly,
he thought that exempla would help.
Swarthmore College
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196–218. Stuttgart.
Linderski, J. 1992. “Games in Patavium.” Ktèma 17: 55–76.
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